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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page76 of 113

run afoul of ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations.’” Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi,
J., majority opinion but “[s]peaking only for [him]self”) (quoting Landgraf, 511
U.S. at 270).

The authority cited by the District Court is not to the contrary. In Vernon v.
Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995), a civil case, the
Court concluded that an amendment to a statute of limitations applied retroactively
because it was procedural. id. at 891, But in Enterprise, Judge Cabranes—writing
for a unanimous Court—retreated altogether from Vernon’s prior characterization
of statutes of limitations as purely “procedural.” As Judge Cabranes wrote, Vernon
“did not create a categorical exception [for statutes of limitations] from Landgraf’s
presumption against retroactive application of legislation.” 391 F.3d at 409. Most
importantly for this case, Enterprise indicated that an extension of the statute of
limitations may operate with impermissible retroactive effect when it applies to
pre-enactment conduct, regardless of whether or not it revives claims that are
altogether time-barred. See id. at 410.

Finally, The District Court also relied on decisions from the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits, which—in tension with the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
Richardson,—concluded that §3283 can be applied retroactively. See U.S. v. Leo
Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir.

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