HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019733.jpg
1.57 MB
Extraction Summary
4
People
7
Organizations
6
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / house oversight document
File Size:
1.57 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 245 from a book titled 'A Single Point of Failure', seemingly included in a House Oversight production related to an Epstein investigation (indicated by the 'Epst' filename prefix). The text details the geopolitical maneuvering surrounding Edward Snowden's flight from Hong Kong to Russia in June 2013, including tracking by the NSA, comments by President Obama, and intelligence strategies regarding 'false flag' operations and obscuring success. It discusses the involvement of US, Chinese, and Russian intelligence services.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Edward Snowden | Intelligence Defector / Hacker |
Subject of the text; described as a 'single point of failure'; being tracked by US, Chinese, and Hong Kong intelligence.
|
| Barack Obama | President of the United States |
Quoted regarding the decision not to scramble jets to capture Snowden.
|
| James Jesus Angleton | Intelligence Official (Implied) |
Referred to as 'Angleton'; quoted by the author regarding espionage strategy ('obscuring a success').
|
| Snowden's Lawyers | Associates |
Their cell phones were used by the NSA to track Snowden's movements.
|
Organizations (7)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| NSA |
National Security Agency; tracking Snowden; source of secret documents.
|
|
| U.S. Intelligence |
Monitoring the situation in Hong Kong.
|
|
| Chinese Security Services |
Monitoring Snowden's moves in Hong Kong.
|
|
| Hong Kong Security Services |
Monitoring Snowden's moves.
|
|
| Russian Consulate |
Location Snowden was observed entering.
|
|
| Aeroflot |
Airline carrying Snowden to Russia.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Referenced in the Bates stamp (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019733).
|
Timeline (3 events)
Locations (6)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
City where Snowden was located for 15 days; under China's scrutiny.
|
|
|
Country controlling Hong Kong.
|
|
|
Seeking to capture Snowden.
|
|
|
Destination of Snowden.
|
|
|
Location of diplomatic back channel protests.
|
|
|
Airport where Snowden landed on June 23.
|
Relationships (2)
NSA tracked Snowden via their cell phones.
Author
→
Source/Interviewee
→
Angleton
Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence...
Key Quotes (3)
""I'm not going to be scrambling jets to get a twenty-nine-year-old hacker," President Obama said on June 27."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019733.jpg
Quote #1
""The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game," Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is "obscuring a success.""Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019733.jpg
Quote #2
""single point of failure," as Snowden described himself"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019733.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,357 characters)
A Single Point of Failure | 245
during his next fifteen days in Hong Kong would not likely escape
China's scrutiny.
China's scrutiny.
The United States had the ability to also follow Snowden's move-
ments via the cell phones of his lawyers and other confederates
after he surfaced. All tracking could be done by the NSA. What the
United States lacked was any practical means to capture a high-
profile intelligence defector in a city that was part of China. By this
time, U.S. intelligence had established that Chinese and Hong Kong
security services were monitoring Snowden's every move. This left
few options in the game for the United States. "I'm not going to
be scrambling jets to get a twenty-nine-year-old hacker," President
Obama said on June 27.
ments via the cell phones of his lawyers and other confederates
after he surfaced. All tracking could be done by the NSA. What the
United States lacked was any practical means to capture a high-
profile intelligence defector in a city that was part of China. By this
time, U.S. intelligence had established that Chinese and Hong Kong
security services were monitoring Snowden's every move. This left
few options in the game for the United States. "I'm not going to
be scrambling jets to get a twenty-nine-year-old hacker," President
Obama said on June 27.
The real prize, in any case, was not Snowden but the NSA's secret
documents that he had with him. When Snowden was observed
entering the Russian consulate, the game was all but over. U.S. dip-
lomats could protest over back channels to Moscow, as they did, but
with a trove of NSA secrets at stake there was little expectation that
would stop the Russians. Two days later, the "single point of failure,"
as Snowden described himself, was on his way to Russia, where his
hosts would be calling the shots.
documents that he had with him. When Snowden was observed
entering the Russian consulate, the game was all but over. U.S. dip-
lomats could protest over back channels to Moscow, as they did, but
with a trove of NSA secrets at stake there was little expectation that
would stop the Russians. Two days later, the "single point of failure,"
as Snowden described himself, was on his way to Russia, where his
hosts would be calling the shots.
When a victory is obtained in a major sports event, it is cause for
public celebrations. The opposite is true in espionage. An intelligence
victory involving secret documents, even if it cannot be entirely
hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of
the coup. "The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,"
Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is "obscuring
a success."
public celebrations. The opposite is true in espionage. An intelligence
victory involving secret documents, even if it cannot be entirely
hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of
the coup. "The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,"
Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is "obscuring
a success."
Following Angleton's precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli-
gence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self-
described "single point of failure," would work to cover their tracks in
the affair even before the Aeroflot plane carrying Snowden touched
down at Sheremetyevo International Airport on June 23. If any false
flag operations had been used to trick, mislead, or otherwise induce
Snowden to come to Hong Kong, they would be disbanded. If any
safe house had been used to quarter Snowden in his first eleven days
in Hong Kong, it would be shut down. If any operatives had been
gence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self-
described "single point of failure," would work to cover their tracks in
the affair even before the Aeroflot plane carrying Snowden touched
down at Sheremetyevo International Airport on June 23. If any false
flag operations had been used to trick, mislead, or otherwise induce
Snowden to come to Hong Kong, they would be disbanded. If any
safe house had been used to quarter Snowden in his first eleven days
in Hong Kong, it would be shut down. If any operatives had been
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9/30/16 8:13 AM
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