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this saga.” I told the President that I still believed that we were facing a “moment
of truth.” But only if he could “shake” Arafat, and get him to sense the enormity of
the stakes – an independent Palestinian state, versus more, and undoubtedly
deadlier, violence.

And if it did come to armed conflict? “When the people of Israel will
understand how far we were ready to go, we will have the power to stand together,
unified, in such a struggle, however tough it will become, even if we will be forced
to confront the entire world. There is no power in the world that can force on us
collective national suicide. Peace will be achieved only if there is a willingness to
negotiate on both sides. I am sure the people of Israel, and the American people,
will understand it when the details will be revealed.”

Clinton had already left for Arafat’s cabin by the time Danny Yatom went to
deliver the letter. But the President, too, was in a more sober and downbeat mood
by the time that meeting was over. Late that night when, having now read my note,
he joined me on the balcony of Dogwood. He looked exhausted. “It was the
toughest meeting I’ve ever had with Arafat,” he said. Clinton said he had told the
Palestinian leader that only one side, the Israelis, had so far been negotiating in
good faith. If Arafat was not prepared to make a genuine effort to reach an
agreement, then there was no choice but for all of us to go home. Now, it seemed,
both the President and I were left to wait and see what, if anything, Arafat came up
with in reply.

“I’ve been through battles, and danger, in my life,” I said. “But in terms of my
responsibility, today, for me as well, was probably the toughest. Shlomo and Gili
went beyond what I could live with. If this offer can’t move him, then I believe we
are left to prepare for war.” I told the President he didn’t even need to phone me
after hearing from Arafat if all he offered was some clever half-reply. Only if it
was serious and substantive. I also reminded him that while he’d promised Arafat
that he would not “blame” the Palestinians if the summit failed, that had been on
the basis of negotiating in good faith. I hoped that, if the summit collapsed in these
circumstances, he would keep to that standard.

Finally, I touched on an immediate concern if the summit broke up. For months,
the Palestinians had been talking about simply “declaring” a Palestinian state. The
Americans had insisted neither side should resort to unilateral action in a conflict
whose resolution depended on mutual agreement. The Europeans had been less

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