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806 KB
Extraction Summary
4
People
2
Organizations
0
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
806 KB
Summary
This legal document is a portion of a prosecution filing arguing against a motion by the defendant, Ms. Maxwell, to sever perjury charges from other substantive counts (Mann Act). The prosecution contends that trying the counts together is judicially efficient, not unduly prejudicial, and that the defendant's claims of prejudice are generalized and can be managed with jury instructions. The filing also dismisses the defendant's concern that her attorneys from a prior civil suit might be called to testify, arguing it does not meet the threshold for disqualification.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ms. Maxwell | Defendant |
Mentioned as the defendant arguing for severance of perjury counts, with her credibility being a central issue.
|
| Werner |
Cited in a legal case (Werner, 620 F.2d at 929) regarding prejudice in trials.
|
|
| Rivera |
Cited in a legal case (Rivera, 546 F.3d at 254) regarding "generalized claim[s] of prejudice".
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| Murray |
Cited in a legal case (Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co.) discussing the advocate-witness rule.
|
Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Government | government agency |
Mentioned in a footnote as noting that three of the defendant's attorneys had no involvement in a related civil suit.
|
| Met. Life Ins. Co. | company |
Mentioned as a party in the legal case citation 'Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co.'.
|
Timeline (2 events)
Discussion of the defendant's motion to sever perjury counts from Mann Act counts for trial.
A prior defamation suit involving the defendant, from which the perjury counts originate.
Relationships (1)
The document discusses the defendant's relationship with her counsel from a prior defamation suit and the possibility of them having to testify, which could deny her counsel of her choice.
Key Quotes (5)
"such evidence might lead to evidence . . . which would justify forfeiture"Source
— Unknown
(Quoted as part of a legal argument regarding evidence from a defamation case.)
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Quote #1
"will necessarily introduce into the trial the issue of Ms. Maxwell’s credibility."Source
— Defendant (Ms. Maxwell)
(Quoted from the defendant's motion (Def. Mot. 5 at 13) as the reason for requesting severance of perjury counts.)
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Quote #2
"adverse effect of being tried for two crimes rather than one"Source
— Werner, 620 F.2d at 929
(A legal principle cited to argue that being tried for multiple crimes is not inherently prejudicial.)
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Quote #3
"generalized claim[s] of prejudice,"Source
— Rivera, 546 F.3d at 254
(Cited to characterize the defendant's argument for severance as insufficient.)
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Quote #4
"on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client."Source
— N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b)
(Quoted from a rule of professional conduct regarding when a lawyer may be disqualified for being a witness.)
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Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,468 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 176 of 239
“such evidence might lead to evidence . . . which would justify forfeiture”). The jury need not decide the outcome of the defamation case in order to evaluate whether truthful answers were capable of influencing the decisionmaker or could reasonably have led to the discovery of admissible evidence.54
Finally, the defendant argues that severance is appropriate because including the perjury counts “will necessarily introduce into the trial the issue of Ms. Maxwell’s credibility.” (Def. Mot. 5 at 13). That is true anytime perjury or false statements counts are joined with other offenses, yet joining perjury or false statements counts to the substantive crimes they concern is the rule, not the exception. And more generally, the “adverse effect of being tried for two crimes rather than one” is not prejudice. Werner, 620 F.2d at 929.
Trying the perjury counts with the Mann Act counts they concern makes eminent sense. Doing so greatly advances judicial efficiency by avoiding the need for two trials at which the same evidence would be presented, including testimony from the same victims. Just as the counts are similar in character, the trial would not be unwieldy. Against these efficiencies, endorsed by the liberal joinder principles behind Rule 8, the defendant identifies at most only “generalized claim[s] of prejudice,” Rivera, 546 F.3d at 254, that can be cured by an appropriate limiting instruction. She thus falls far short of meeting her heavy burden, and her motion should be denied.
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54 The defendant relatedly suggests that her counsel from the defamation suit may have to testify regarding the perjury counts, denying her counsel of her choice. She has not identified what factual issue they might testify to and why it must come from one of the lawyers who represented her on both that case and this one. The Government notes, in this respect, that three of the defendant’s attorneys in this case had no involvement in the civil suit. Even if such testimony were necessary by one of the defendant’s lawyers, it would only disqualify the firm if that lawyer is called “on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client.” N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b); see generally Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 177-80 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the advocate-witness rule).
54 The defendant relatedly suggests that her counsel from the defamation suit may have to testify regarding the perjury counts, denying her counsel of her choice. She has not identified what factual issue they might testify to and why it must come from one of the lawyers who represented her on both that case and this one. The Government notes, in this respect, that three of the defendant’s attorneys in this case had no involvement in the civil suit. Even if such testimony were necessary by one of the defendant’s lawyers, it would only disqualify the firm if that lawyer is called “on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client.” N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b); see generally Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 177-80 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the advocate-witness rule).
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