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Extraction Summary

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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Quotes

Document Information

Type: Legal document
File Size: 714 KB
Summary

This legal document is a court's discussion regarding a defendant's motion to dismiss two counts of an indictment, arguing they are multiplicitous (i.e., charge the same crime multiple times). The Court decides that the motion is premature and defers its ruling until after the trial is complete. The Court reasons that a full factual record is needed for the analysis and the issue could become moot depending on the jury's verdict.

People (2)

Name Role Context
Rivera Party in a cited case
Mentioned in the case citation 'United States v. Rivera, No. 09 Cr. 619 (SJF), 2011 WL 1429125, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. ...
Josephberg Party in a cited case
Mentioned in the case citation 'See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355'.

Organizations (2)

Name Type Context
United States Government agency
Mentioned as a party in the case citation 'United States v. Rivera'.
Second Circuit Government agency
Mentioned as providing a directive that the Court is following to defer ruling on the motion.

Timeline (2 events)

2021-04-16
The Court deferred ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss, stating it is premature and should be considered after the completion of the trial.
The Court
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss Counts One or Three of the Indictment as multiplicitous.
defendant

Locations (1)

Location Context
Mentioned in a case citation as the Eastern District of New York.

Key Quotes (1)

"Since it is possible that the jury will convict defendants on only one (1) of the respective counts that they allege are multiplicitous, and acquit defendants on all of the counts with which they allege that count is multiplicitous, the issue of whether the counts are multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause is premature at the pretrial stage."
Source
— United States v. Rivera (A quote from a cited legal case used to support the Court's decision to defer its ruling.)
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Quote #1

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,151 characters)

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 199 of 239
the Court will enter judgment on only one of the multiplicitous convictions.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Rivera, No. 09 Cr. 619 (SJF), 2011 WL 1429125, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011) (“Since it is possible that the jury will convict defendants on only one (1) of the respective counts that they allege are multiplicitous, and acquit defendants on all of the counts with which they allege that count is multiplicitous, the issue of whether the counts are multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause is premature at the pretrial stage.”).
C. Discussion
The defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts One or Three of the Indictment as multiplicitous is, at best, premature. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit, this Court should defer ruling on this motion until after the completion of trial. The additional time will ensure that the full factual record is developed before the Court conducts the multiplicity analysis, and the motion may become moot depending on the jury’s verdict.
First, the Court cannot conduct the multiplicity analysis before hearing all of the evidence regarding the charges contained in the Indictment. Prior to trial, the record will not be fully developed, and the Court cannot conduct the necessary analysis to determine whether the counts are in fact multiplicitous. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit and the consistent practice in this District, the Court should defer conducting any multiplicity analysis until after hearing all of the evidence at trial. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355.
Second, the motion may become moot because it is possible that the jury could conclude that the defendant is guilty of one of the charged conspiracies but not guilty of the other. That is because each charged conspiracy alleges that the defendant agreed to violate a different criminal statute. Count One alleges that the defendant agreed to transport minors with the intent that they engage in illegal sex acts. Count Three alleges that the defendant agreed to entice minors to travel
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DOJ-OGR-00003133

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