HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018112.jpg

28

Israel. Likewise, Hizballah would expect Iran to assist it and any
conflict with Israel. Either case could eventually involve Syria.
Hizballah can now strike targets throughout Israel. Its missiles and
rockets are also accurate enough to hit military installations and other
important facilities, and it can fire as many as 500–600 per day.
Hizballah also has the ability to conduct terrorist or special
operations against civilian, military and infrastructure targets outside
the immediate theater of war. Sheikh Nasrallah has plausibly
threatened to attack shipping in the eastern Mediterranean in the
event of a conflict with Israel.12 If Hizballah were to gain access to
Syria’s P-800 Yakhont supersonic cruise missile system—a distinct
possibility—it could potentially strike targets as distant as 300
kilometers from the Lebanese coast.
Syrian military forces are optimized and deployed for war with Israel,
so it would have only a limited ability to directly assist Iran in a
conflict with the United States. Syria’s missile systems could target
military sites, logistics facilities and airfields in Israel. Syria’s
Yakhont coastal defense cruise missile system gives it an enhanced
capability to threaten naval and merchant vessels in the eastern
Mediterranean.
Hamas is also part of this threat environment, although its offensive
and defensive capabilities are much more limited than Hizballah’s.
Hamas’s offensive capabilities rest on mortars and rockets of
gradually increasing range, bringing more of central and southern
Israel under threat with every upgrade. Hamas can now reach central
Tel Aviv and beyond Beersheba in southern Israel.
Iran will likely supplement this proxy war by exploiting “images of
victory”—such as sinking a U.S. naval unit or displaying U.S.
casualties and prisoners to undermine support for the U.S. action and
bolster its own supporters.

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018112