HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020604.jpg
1.76 MB
Extraction Summary
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People
2
Organizations
14
Locations
0
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Government report appendix / house oversight document
File Size:
1.76 MB
Summary
This document is 'Appendix 2' of a larger report, likely from the House Oversight Committee, detailing Chinese influence activities globally. It outlines the CCP's strategy of using 'soft power' (research centers, media, university ties) and economic leverage to suppress criticism and penetrate democratic institutions in countries including Australia, Canada, and the UK. The text highlights the asymmetry of China closing its own borders to influence while exploiting the openness of democratic systems abroad.
Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
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| Chinese Communist Party |
Described as refining efforts to exploit democratic systems and suppress criticism.
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| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020604'.
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Locations (14)
| Location | Context |
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Comparing influence activities here versus other regions.
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Origin of influence activities.
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Noted as a location where influence activities have proceeded further than in the US.
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Region with advanced influence activities.
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Region with advanced influence activities.
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Evidence of influence activities present.
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Evidence of influence activities present.
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Listed as one of the eight countries summarized in the appendix.
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Listed as one of the eight countries summarized in the appendix.
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Listed as one of the eight countries summarized in the appendix.
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Listed as one of the eight countries summarized in the appendix.
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Listed as one of the eight countries summarized in the appendix.
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Listed as one of the eight countries summarized in the appendix.
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Listed as one of the eight countries summarized in the appendix.
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Relationships (1)
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
→
Adversarial/Influence
→
Democratic Societies
Text describes CCP using soft power vehicles to mimic civil society and exploit democratic openness.
Key Quotes (3)
"China’s Communist party-state has established barriers to external political influence at home while, at the same time, seizing upon the openness of democratic systems overseas."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020604.jpg
Quote #1
"Beijing is particularly skilled at using economic leverage to advance political goals in the realm of ideas, working through indirect channels that are not always apparent unless one examines Chinese business activities in conjunction with Beijing’s other influence efforts."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020604.jpg
Quote #2
"Targeting the media, academia, and the policy community, Beijing seeks to penetrate institutions in democratic states that might draw attention or raise obstacles to CCP interests, creating disincentives for any such resistance."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020604.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,505 characters)
APPENDIX 2
Chinese Influence Activities in
Select Countries
Select Countries
This report has focused on the range of challenges the United States faces in an era
of accelerating Chinese influence activities on multiple fronts. But this issue is hardly
unique to the United States—indeed, China’s influence activities now occur all around
the world. In some instances, notably Australia, these activities appear to have proceeded
much further than they have so far in the United States. In general, they seem more
advanced in Asia and Europe, but there is also evidence of such activities in Africa and
Latin America as well.
of accelerating Chinese influence activities on multiple fronts. But this issue is hardly
unique to the United States—indeed, China’s influence activities now occur all around
the world. In some instances, notably Australia, these activities appear to have proceeded
much further than they have so far in the United States. In general, they seem more
advanced in Asia and Europe, but there is also evidence of such activities in Africa and
Latin America as well.
In order to explore some of the wider patterns that have emerged, this appendix offers
brief summaries of the effects of such activities in eight countries: Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. In each
of these settings, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has refined its efforts through
trial and error in order to exploit a critical asymmetry: China’s Communist party-state
has established barriers to external political influence at home while, at the same time,
seizing upon the openness of democratic systems overseas.
brief summaries of the effects of such activities in eight countries: Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. In each
of these settings, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has refined its efforts through
trial and error in order to exploit a critical asymmetry: China’s Communist party-state
has established barriers to external political influence at home while, at the same time,
seizing upon the openness of democratic systems overseas.
China seeks to make itself more palatable to democratic societies by using many of
the customary vehicles of soft power—such as state-funded research centers, media
outlets, university ties, and people-to-people exchange programs. These programs
mimic the work of independent civil society institutions in a democracy, cloaking
the extent to which the party-state controls these activities and genuine civil society
is tightly repressed inside China. In conjunction with the dramatic expansion of
Chinese economic interests abroad, the Chinese government has focused its influence
initiatives on obscuring its policies and suppressing, to the extent possible, voices
beyond China’s borders that are critical of the CCP.¹ Targeting the media, academia,
and the policy community, Beijing seeks to penetrate institutions in democratic states
that might draw attention or raise obstacles to CCP interests, creating disincentives for
any such resistance. Chinese economic activity is another important tool in this effort.
Beijing is particularly skilled at using economic leverage to advance political goals in
the realm of ideas, working through indirect channels that are not always apparent
unless one examines Chinese business activities in conjunction with Beijing’s other
influence efforts.
the customary vehicles of soft power—such as state-funded research centers, media
outlets, university ties, and people-to-people exchange programs. These programs
mimic the work of independent civil society institutions in a democracy, cloaking
the extent to which the party-state controls these activities and genuine civil society
is tightly repressed inside China. In conjunction with the dramatic expansion of
Chinese economic interests abroad, the Chinese government has focused its influence
initiatives on obscuring its policies and suppressing, to the extent possible, voices
beyond China’s borders that are critical of the CCP.¹ Targeting the media, academia,
and the policy community, Beijing seeks to penetrate institutions in democratic states
that might draw attention or raise obstacles to CCP interests, creating disincentives for
any such resistance. Chinese economic activity is another important tool in this effort.
Beijing is particularly skilled at using economic leverage to advance political goals in
the realm of ideas, working through indirect channels that are not always apparent
unless one examines Chinese business activities in conjunction with Beijing’s other
influence efforts.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020604
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