HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638.jpg
1.79 MB
Extraction Summary
5
People
6
Organizations
7
Locations
4
Events
1
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Report / government oversight document (appendix)
File Size:
1.79 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 179 (Appendix 2) of a larger report included in House Oversight Committee files (Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638). The text focuses on geopolitical analysis, specifically Chinese influence operations in the United Kingdom, contrasting the UK's lack of debate on the subject with the US, Australia, and New Zealand. It cites various events involving Singapore and China between 2015 and 2017, but contains no direct references to Jeffrey Epstein or his specific associates on this page.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Jermyn Chow | Journalist/Author |
Author of article cited in Note 2 regarding SAF armoured vehicles.
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| Huang Jing | Subject |
Individual whose Singapore Permanent Residence status was cancelled (Note 3).
|
| Yang Xiuping | Subject |
Individual whose Singapore Permanent Residence status was cancelled (Note 3).
|
| Shannon Teoh | Journalist/Author |
Co-author of article cited in Note 4.
|
| Eunice Au | Journalist/Author |
Co-author of article cited in Note 4.
|
Organizations (6)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Government of Singapore |
Cited in Note 1.
|
|
| Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs |
Issued statement regarding residence cancellation (Note 3).
|
|
| Straits Times |
Newspaper cited in Notes 2 and 4.
|
|
| GPPi |
Global Public Policy Institute, co-author of a report mentioned in the final paragraph.
|
|
| Merics |
Mercator Institute for China Studies, co-author of a report mentioned in the final paragraph.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638'.
|
Timeline (4 events)
2014
August 6, 2017
Cancellation of Singapore Permanent Residence (SPR) Status for Huang Jing and Yang Xiuping
Singapore
Locations (7)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Subject of the analysis regarding state nature and influence operations.
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|
|
Location of events cited in Notes.
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|
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Location where SAF armoured vehicles were seized.
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Primary subject of the main text regarding Chinese influence operations.
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Mentioned for comparison regarding debates on Chinese influence.
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Mentioned for comparison regarding debates on Chinese influence.
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|
Mentioned for comparison regarding debates on Chinese influence.
|
Relationships (1)
Both mentioned in Note 3 regarding the cancellation of their Permanent Residence status.
Key Quotes (4)
"embedded in the intrinsic nature of the Chinese state, they cannot be abandoned unless the nature of the Chinese state fundamentally changes."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638.jpg
Quote #1
"Unlike the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the United Kingdom has had no significant all-encompassing debate over Chinese influence operations."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638.jpg
Quote #2
"Britain’s response to China’s attempts to insinuate itself within Britain’s critical infrastructure, universities, civil society, political system, and think tanks has been scattershot at best."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638.jpg
Quote #3
"Especially since the official elevation of UK-China relations to Golden Era status in 2014 and the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom has become more open to Chinese influence."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,830 characters)
179
embedded in the intrinsic nature of the Chinese state, they cannot be abandoned unless the nature of the Chinese state fundamentally changes. This is very unlikely.
NOTES
1 “Singapore Government Statement,” Government of Singapore, May 15, 1971, http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/SGPress_3_15.5.71.pdf.
2 Jermyn Chow, “SAF Armoured Vehicles Seized in Hong Kong Port, Mindef Expects Shipment to Return to Singapore ‘Expeditiously,’” Straits Times (Singapore), November 24, 2016, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/9-saf-armoured-vehicles-seized-at-hong-kong-port.
3 “Cancellation of Singapore Permanent Residence (SPR) Status—Huang Jing and Yang Xiuping,” Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, August 6, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/press-release/news/cancellation-of-singapore-permanent-residence-(spr)-status—huang-jing-and-yang-xiuping.
4 Shannon Teoh and Eunice Au, “KL Wants Chinese Envoy to Explain Remarks,” Straits Times (Singapore), October 2, 2015, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/kl-wants-chinese-envoy-to-explain-remarks.
UNITED KINGDOM
Unlike the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the United Kingdom has had no significant all-encompassing debate over Chinese influence operations. When they have occurred, the debates tend to be confined to specific areas such as the media, academia, or the economy. But so far, no one institute has attempted to bring to light the full gamut of Chinese United Front and influence-peddling operations. As such, Britain’s response to China’s attempts to insinuate itself within Britain’s critical infrastructure, universities, civil society, political system, and think tanks has been scattershot at best.
The United Kingdom has a complex political, economic, and historical relationship with China, which is a significant trading partner and an increasingly significant source of investment.1 Especially since the official elevation of UK-China relations to Golden Era status in 2014 and the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom has become more open to Chinese influence.2 Areas of vulnerability to improper interference include political and civil society actors as well as the media. Chinese firms are involved in strategic parts of the British economy, including telecommunications and nuclear power. Improper interference activities can be difficult to distinguish from acceptable influence via civil society exchange, public diplomacy, and commerce. Problem cases include not only Chinese cyberattacks on political organizations and think tanks but also willing collaboration and reluctant complicity. A report by GPPi and Merics characterized the most important areas for Chinese
Appendix 2
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638
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