HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115.jpg
2.53 MB
Extraction Summary
0
People
3
Organizations
2
Locations
1
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Report / policy analysis / strategic paper (page 31)
File Size:
2.53 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 31 of a strategic policy report or white paper labeled with a House Oversight stamp. The text analyzes the complexities of engaging in and exiting a war with Iran, discussing asymmetric conflict, the difficulty of defining success in political terms, and the potential consequences of attacking Iran's nuclear program. It does not contain specific names of individuals or direct references to Jeffrey Epstein, but is likely part of a larger tranche of documents produced for a congressional investigation.
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States |
Mentioned as a potential participant in conflict with Iran and receiving retaliation.
|
|
| Iranian regime / Iran |
The subject of the strategic analysis regarding potential war scenarios and nuclear program.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Identified via the document stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115'.
|
Timeline (1 events)
Locations (2)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
Relationships (1)
Discussion of war, retaliation, and inflicting damage.
Key Quotes (3)
"This is why wars are easier to get into than out of."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115.jpg
Quote #1
"Measuring success becomes harder as aims become more political and psychological, such as weakening or toppling a regime"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115.jpg
Quote #2
"Any attack on Iran of sufficient scale to significantly damage its nuclear program would have rolling consequences both in the short and long term."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,023 characters)
31
know about their capabilities and the situation. They begin taking
concrete steps along the path that they think will get them to that end.
They learn far too slowly that what they initially thought they knew
was in fact wrong or no longer relevant. . . . Things can get much
more convoluted by adding allies, different influential actors among
the polity, and multiple adversaries. This is why wars are easier to get
into than out of.15
Knowing when to end a war relates to war aims and measures of
success. A war’s aims should be definitive enough so that success can
be measured in some clear way. This is easiest to do where the aims
concern discrete things such as the destruction of material targets.
Measuring success becomes harder as aims become more political
and psychological, such as weakening or toppling a regime,
encouraging opposition or deterring further action. Then, too, war
aims can expand as fighting escalates or broadens. In a situation in
which Iran has retaliated strongly and managed to inflict losses
(especially civilian losses) on the United States or its coalition
partners, we should expect to hear calls to inflict more damage, to
punish the regime and its forces, to bring a “decisive” end to the
conflict.
Short of inflicting a total defeat on Iran, an outcome that seems
scarcely conceivable, exiting the war could be challenging if Iran
chooses to fight on in some form of asymmetric conflict. We might
then have to compel Iran to quit, and that could potentially require
the application of force well beyond what was originally agreed upon
within the United States or with coalition partners. Even then, if the
Iranian regime survives at all, it is likely to declare victory, and many
of its supporters would believe it. How or when a war with Iran
would actually end is therefore no easy topic to nail down. Any attack
on Iran of sufficient scale to significantly damage its nuclear program
would have rolling consequences both in the short and long term.
concrete steps along the path that they think will get them to that end.
They learn far too slowly that what they initially thought they knew
was in fact wrong or no longer relevant. . . . Things can get much
more convoluted by adding allies, different influential actors among
the polity, and multiple adversaries. This is why wars are easier to get
into than out of.15
Knowing when to end a war relates to war aims and measures of
success. A war’s aims should be definitive enough so that success can
be measured in some clear way. This is easiest to do where the aims
concern discrete things such as the destruction of material targets.
Measuring success becomes harder as aims become more political
and psychological, such as weakening or toppling a regime,
encouraging opposition or deterring further action. Then, too, war
aims can expand as fighting escalates or broadens. In a situation in
which Iran has retaliated strongly and managed to inflict losses
(especially civilian losses) on the United States or its coalition
partners, we should expect to hear calls to inflict more damage, to
punish the regime and its forces, to bring a “decisive” end to the
conflict.
Short of inflicting a total defeat on Iran, an outcome that seems
scarcely conceivable, exiting the war could be challenging if Iran
chooses to fight on in some form of asymmetric conflict. We might
then have to compel Iran to quit, and that could potentially require
the application of force well beyond what was originally agreed upon
within the United States or with coalition partners. Even then, if the
Iranian regime survives at all, it is likely to declare victory, and many
of its supporters would believe it. How or when a war with Iran
would actually end is therefore no easy topic to nail down. Any attack
on Iran of sufficient scale to significantly damage its nuclear program
would have rolling consequences both in the short and long term.
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018115
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