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2.05 MB
Extraction Summary
2
People
7
Organizations
4
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Policy report / briefing paper
File Size:
2.05 MB
Summary
This document is page 9 of a policy report or geopolitical analysis (Bates stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_026864) discussing the 'Centrality of Chinese National Interests' under Xi Jinping. It analyzes the outcomes of the 2018 Central Foreign Policy Conference, noting a shift toward unapologetic nationalism and the inclusion of the South China Sea as a core interest. The text concludes by questioning how various international bodies (EU, ASEAN, etc.) and the US (under Trump) will respond to China's 'invitation' to engage with its new global vision.
People (2)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Xi Jinping | Paramount Leader of China |
Described as defining the core principles of new diplomacy and holding deep views reflected in China's worldview.
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| Trump | President of the United States (implied) |
Mentioned in the final rhetorical question regarding what America wants 'with or without Trump'.
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Organizations (7)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| European Union |
Questioned regarding its desires for future international order.
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| ASEAN |
Association of Southeast Asian Nations; questioned regarding its desires.
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| East Asia Summit |
Questioned regarding its desires.
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| African Union |
Questioned regarding its desires.
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| Organization of American States |
Questioned regarding its desires.
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| Gulf Cooperation Council |
Questioned regarding its desires.
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| House Oversight Committee |
Source of the document via Bates stamp.
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Timeline (2 events)
2018
Central Foreign Policy Conference (also referred to as Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs)
China
Chinese Government
Xi Jinping
Locations (4)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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Primary subject of the policy analysis.
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Cited as an example of evolving core national interests.
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Historical/Cultural reference to China.
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Mentioned in the context of geopolitical desires.
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Relationships (1)
Referred to as 'China's paramount leader Xi Jinping'.
Key Quotes (4)
"Xi concludes his list of ten governing principles with the following: that China must take its “core national interests as the bottom line to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development interests”."Source
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Quote #1
"Xi makes plain that China’s foreign policy is unapologetically nationalist."Source
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Quote #2
"But what we are seeing is the slow, steady emergence of a more integrated Chinese worldview which links China’s domestic vision with its international vision"Source
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Quote #3
"What exactly does America want, with or without Trump?"Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,785 characters)
THE CENTRALITY OF CHINESE NATIONAL INTERESTS
Lest anyone gets too starry-eyed about China’s intentions for reforming global governance, in Xi Jinping’s description of the core principles of its new “diplomacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Xi concludes his list of ten governing principles with the following: that China must take its “core national interests as the bottom line to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development interests”.
Xi makes plain that China’s foreign policy is unapologetically nationalist. Xi assumes that all other countries’ foreign policies are nationalist as well.
Of course, China’s definition of its core national interests has evolved over time. As have other nations. It now includes, for example, the South China Sea. A decade ago, that was not a feature of Chinese official statements defining China’s core interests. Now it is. As for any state, therefore, the concept of “core national interests” varies over time and will be defined by the government of the day.
CONCLUSION
But we will soon see how the 2018 Central Foreign Policy Conference translates into different Chinese foreign policy behaviours on the ground. If the 2014 Conference is an effective guide, we will see a heightened period of Chinese foreign policy activism. However the precise content of that activism remains to be seen. But what we are seeing is the slow, steady emergence of a more integrated Chinese worldview which links China’s domestic vision with its international vision - and a vision which very much reflects the deep views of China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping.
The first policy terrain where we are likely to see this is in the existing institutions of global governance. But it will not be restricted to this area. The text of the report of the 2018 Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs suggests that we will also see this across China’s bilateral relations, its engagement with regional institutions, as well as its approach to major power relations as well - all of which are likely to be met with an increasingly forthright Chinese diplomacy.
The challenge for the rest of the international community is to define what type of future international order, system and governance it wants. And to take China’s invitation seriously to engage the Middle Kingdom in a frank and forthright discourse on what the region and the world precisely want in any future “global community of common destiny”.
What does the European Union want? What does ASEAN want? What does the East Asia Summit want? What does the African Union want? What does the Organization of American States want? What does the Gulf Cooperation Council want? What exactly does America want, with or without Trump?
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