HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019640.jpg
1.62 MB
Extraction Summary
4
People
3
Organizations
1
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book page / congressional evidence
File Size:
1.62 MB
Summary
This document is page 152 from the book 'How America Lost Its Secrets' (likely by Edward Jay Epstein), marked as evidence for the House Oversight Committee. The text analyzes Edward Snowden's theft of NSA data, arguing that technical barriers (sealed USB ports, PKI card requirements) and timeline discrepancies suggest Snowden must have had an accomplice inside the NSA/Booz Allen to succeed. It details communications between Snowden and Laura Poitras in April 2013.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Edward Snowden | Subject of text |
Former NSA contractor/Booz Allen employee accused of stealing secrets.
|
| Laura Poitras | Journalist/Filmmaker |
Referred to as 'Poitras'; received communication from Snowden regarding document delivery.
|
| Unnamed Source | Former Booz Allen Executive |
Provided information to the author regarding NSA security protocols and PKI cards.
|
| Edward Jay Epstein | Author |
Implied author of the book 'How America Lost Its Secrets' (indicated by filename 'Epst' and book title).
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Booz Allen Hamilton |
referred to as 'Booz Allen'; employer of the source and Snowden.
|
|
| NSA |
National Security Agency; location where the data theft occurred.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019640'.
|
Timeline (2 events)
April 2013
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Refers to the NSA facility where Snowden worked.
|
Relationships (2)
We know from Poitras that Snowden told her in early April 2013...
The only way... was that he already knew someone there who would help him.
Key Quotes (3)
"The only way he could mitigate the risk of detection was by having someone help him build this network."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019640.jpg
Quote #1
"Just asking such a favor could 'set off alarms,' my source said."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019640.jpg
Quote #2
"The only way he could have known for certain... was that he already knew someone there who would help him."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019640.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,410 characters)
152 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS
nections. Making the task even more risky, according to my Booz Allen source, there were closed-circuit cameras. The only way he could mitigate the risk of detection was by having someone help him build this network.
Even if Snowden had managed to obtain all the necessary passwords from colleagues, he would have had to transfer the files to an external storage device. This was not a matter of simply attaching a thumb drive or other external device to a port, because, unlike in movies such as Mission: Impossible, the ports on the computers at the NSA were ordinarily sealed shut. This measure was taken specifically to prevent any unauthorized downloading by NSA workers. The only people at the center who had the authorization, and the means, to open these ports and transfer data were system administrators, according to the former Booz Allen executive. System administrators needed to have this privilege to deal with glitches in the computers. Snowden was no longer a system administrator and had no such privileges. So again, he would have needed help. He would have needed to either borrow a system administrator’s credential or forge his own.
The credential he would need is called a public key infrastructure, or PKI, card with its authentication code embedded in a magnetic strip. When I asked the former Booz Allen executive if Snowden possessed the skill set to forge such a card, he said that he strongly doubted any NSA employee would be capable of such a forgery without special equipment. Just asking such a favor could “set off alarms,” my source said.
The unwitting accomplice scenario had another stumbling block: time. We know from Poitras that Snowden told her in early April 2013 that he planned to deliver documents to her in six to eight weeks (which he in fact did). But he had not yet started working for Booz Allen at the center until that same month. It does not seem plausible that in making such a commitment he was merely counting on his ingenuity in the face of strangers to fulfill it. The only way he could have known for certain that he would be able to borrow a PKI card and obtain the passwords, whether by trickery, by observation, or by a key router, before he had begun working at the center was that he already knew someone there who would help him.
Even if Snowden had managed to obtain all the necessary passwords from colleagues, he would have had to transfer the files to an external storage device. This was not a matter of simply attaching a thumb drive or other external device to a port, because, unlike in movies such as Mission: Impossible, the ports on the computers at the NSA were ordinarily sealed shut. This measure was taken specifically to prevent any unauthorized downloading by NSA workers. The only people at the center who had the authorization, and the means, to open these ports and transfer data were system administrators, according to the former Booz Allen executive. System administrators needed to have this privilege to deal with glitches in the computers. Snowden was no longer a system administrator and had no such privileges. So again, he would have needed help. He would have needed to either borrow a system administrator’s credential or forge his own.
The credential he would need is called a public key infrastructure, or PKI, card with its authentication code embedded in a magnetic strip. When I asked the former Booz Allen executive if Snowden possessed the skill set to forge such a card, he said that he strongly doubted any NSA employee would be capable of such a forgery without special equipment. Just asking such a favor could “set off alarms,” my source said.
The unwitting accomplice scenario had another stumbling block: time. We know from Poitras that Snowden told her in early April 2013 that he planned to deliver documents to her in six to eight weeks (which he in fact did). But he had not yet started working for Booz Allen at the center until that same month. It does not seem plausible that in making such a commitment he was merely counting on his ingenuity in the face of strangers to fulfill it. The only way he could have known for certain that he would be able to borrow a PKI card and obtain the passwords, whether by trickery, by observation, or by a key router, before he had begun working at the center was that he already knew someone there who would help him.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 152
9/29/16 5:51 PM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019640
9/29/16 5:51 PM
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019640
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