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Extraction Summary
2
People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
594 KB
Summary
This legal document argues that the extended statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3283 is not applicable to Counts Three and Four of an indictment. The reasoning provided is that the relevant offenses, defined under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) and § 2422(a), are crimes of intent and do not require sexual abuse, physical abuse, or kidnapping as an essential element. The document cites case law, including *United States v. Broxmeyer* and *Bridges*, to support the claim that the nature of the offense, not the specific facts alleged in the indictment, determines the applicability of the statute of limitations.
People (2)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Bridges | Party in a legal case |
Cited in the case 'Bridges, 346 U.S. at 222' regarding the principle that embellishing an indictment does not extend ...
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| Broxmeyer | Party in a legal case |
Cited in the case 'United States v. Broxmeyer, 616 F.3d 120, 129 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010)' to support the argument that the...
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Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Government agency |
Mentioned as a party in the case 'United States v. Broxmeyer'.
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Timeline (2 events)
1994-09-13
The amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 became effective as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
2010
The case of United States v. Broxmeyer was decided by the 2d Circuit court.
2d Cir.
Key Quotes (6)
"with intent that the [minor] engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense"Source
— 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)
(Quoting the language of the statute to define the offense in Counts Three and Four.)
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Quote #1
"the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child."Source
— Legal argument
(Describing what the intent required by the statute does not necessarily entail.)
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Quote #2
"crime of intent and a conviction is entirely sustainable even if no underlying criminal sexual act ever occurs."Source
— United States v. Broxmeyer
(Citing case law to explain that the offense under § 2422(a) does not require a completed sexual act.)
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Quote #3
"The embellishment of the indictment does not lengthen the time for prosecution."Source
— Bridges, 346 U.S. at 222
(Citing case law to argue that the specific facts alleged in the indictment do not trigger the extended statute of limitations.)
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Quote #4
"[U]nder the statute[s] creating the offense[s],” physical or sexual abuse of a minor, or kidnaping, is not “an essential ingredient.”"Source
— Legal argument citing case law
(Arguing that since abuse or kidnapping is not a required element of the charged offenses, the extended statute of limitations does not apply.)
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Quote #5
"offense[s] involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years"Source
— § 3283
(Quoting the language of the statute of limitations extension to show why it does not apply to the counts in question.)
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Quote #6
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,802 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 23 of 25
Nor does § 3283 apply to extend the statutes of limitations under Counts Three and Four.
Those counts arise under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which prohibits “transporting” minors across state
lines “with intent that the [minor] engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense” (emphasis added).⁹ Neither that offense nor a conspiracy to
“transport” a minor with such intent necessarily entails “the sexual or physical abuse, or
kidnaping, of a child.” 18 U.S.C. § 3283. Instead, as with § 2422(a), the offense is a “crime of
intent and a conviction is entirely sustainable even if no underlying criminal sexual act ever
occurs.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 616 F.3d 120, 129 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010). For this reason,
Counts Three and Four are not subject to § 3283’s extended statute of limitations.
Those counts arise under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which prohibits “transporting” minors across state
lines “with intent that the [minor] engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense” (emphasis added).⁹ Neither that offense nor a conspiracy to
“transport” a minor with such intent necessarily entails “the sexual or physical abuse, or
kidnaping, of a child.” 18 U.S.C. § 3283. Instead, as with § 2422(a), the offense is a “crime of
intent and a conviction is entirely sustainable even if no underlying criminal sexual act ever
occurs.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 616 F.3d 120, 129 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010). For this reason,
Counts Three and Four are not subject to § 3283’s extended statute of limitations.
It does not matter that the particular facts alleged in the indictment fall within § 3283.
“The embellishment of the indictment does not lengthen the time for prosecution.” Bridges, 346
U.S. at 222. Nor does it matter that sexual abuse of a minor may “often accompan[y]” the
offenses charged. See id. “[U]nder the statute[s] creating the offense[s],” physical or sexual
abuse of a minor, or kidnaping, is not “an essential ingredient.” Id. Thus, § 3283’s extension
for “offense[s] involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of
18 years” does not apply.
“The embellishment of the indictment does not lengthen the time for prosecution.” Bridges, 346
U.S. at 222. Nor does it matter that sexual abuse of a minor may “often accompan[y]” the
offenses charged. See id. “[U]nder the statute[s] creating the offense[s],” physical or sexual
abuse of a minor, or kidnaping, is not “an essential ingredient.” Id. Thus, § 3283’s extension
for “offense[s] involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of
18 years” does not apply.
⁹ 18 U.S.C. § 2423 was amended effective September 13, 1994, to add a subsection (b) and make cosmetic
adjustments, immaterial here, to what is now subsection (a). Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, PL 103-322, Sept. 13, 1994, Title XVI, § 160001(g), 108 Stat. 1796.
adjustments, immaterial here, to what is now subsection (a). Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, PL 103-322, Sept. 13, 1994, Title XVI, § 160001(g), 108 Stat. 1796.
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