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am still working for the NSA right now. They are the only ones who don’t realize it.” While he
might have sincerely persuaded himself that he was somehow helping US communications
intelligence in a self-appointed role, those familiar with the activities of the Russian security
services find it inconceivable that he could escape their control in Russia. At the very minimum,
a former US intelligence worker who stole American state secrets, such as Snowden, would be
under the FSB’s scrutiny. Andrei Soldatov, the co-author of the 2010 book The New Nobility:
the Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB, and who was
personal knowledgeable about FSB procedures, explained the FSB would monitor “every facet of
Snowden's communications, and his life.” General Oleg Kalugin, who, as previously mentioned,
defected from the KGB to the United States in 1995, added that the FSB following the standard
operating procedures of the KGB, would be “his hosts and they are taking care of him.” Kalugin
further said in 2014 that “Whatever he had access to in his former days at NSA, I believe he
shared all of it with the Russians, and they are very grateful”

American intelligence officers knowledgeable about the operations of the FSB, agreed with
Kalugin’s assessment. General Hayden, for example, who served both as director of the NSA,
CIA, and Air Force counterintelligence, told me in an interview that he saw no other possibility
than Snowden would be induced to cooperate in this situation, saying “I would lose all respect for
the Russian and Chinese security services if they haven’t fully exploited everything Snowden had
to give.” They certainly had that opportunity at Sheremetyevo International Airport: He had
already, at least in the eyes of the Department of Justice, betrayed US secrets by stealing them and
taking them abroad. Snowden was held in limbo in the transit zone. The FSB controlled his
access to food, lodgings, the Internet, and whatever else he needed to survive there. It could also
return him to the US if he did not cooperate. What recourse did Snowden have? The only party
from whom he could seek redress was Putin’s regime. Russia’s leverage now would be even
greater than in Hong Kong. If Putin chose to fully apply it, would be all but irresistible over a
fugitive who had literally no place else to go. In a word, the FSB held all the cards but
one—Snowden’s help with the stolen documents. Even if Snowden disliked the tactics of the
Russian security services, his situation left him a powerful inducement now not to decline the
requests of the Russian authorities.

Two weeks after his arrival, the Russian authorities provided him with a convenient path to
full cooperation with Russia. He was put in contact with Anatoly Grigorievich Kucherena, a
silver-haired 53-year old lawyer, who was known as a personal friend of Putin. Kucherena also
did task for Putin’s party in the Russian parliament or Duma. Most important for Snowden,
Kucherena had excellent connections in the Russian security apparatus since he served on the
oversight committee of the FSB. He also offered to serve as the lawyer for Snowden pro bono.
On July 10, 2013, Snowden officially retained him as his legal representative in Moscow. From
that point on, he would act as Snowden’s go-between with the FSB and other Russian agencies.

At the outset, Kucherena made it clear to Snowden that he would have to play by Moscow’s
rules before the Kremlin would grant him permission to stay in Russia. To begin with, Snowden
had to withdraw any and application he had made elsewhere for asylum. He had to put his fate

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