HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011847.jpg

2.06 MB

Extraction Summary

5
People
5
Organizations
5
Locations
3
Events
3
Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Book excerpt / memoir / evidence file
File Size: 2.06 MB
Summary

This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir or a similar narrative, stamped as evidence by the House Oversight Committee (likely part of the Epstein investigation due to Barak's known association, though Epstein is not mentioned on this specific page). The text details Barak's return to Israel following the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000, focusing on the political instability of his coalition, a survived no-confidence vote initiated by Ariel Sharon, and his instructions to security chiefs (Shin Bet) to prepare for potential violence from Arafat's faction.

People (5)

Name Role Context
Ehud Barak Narrator / Prime Minister of Israel
Narrating his return from Camp David and political struggles. (Name appears in header)
Yasser Arafat Palestinian Leader
Described as returning to Gaza, refusing to give up Jerusalem, and potentially choosing violence.
Arik Sharon Opposition Politician (Likud)
Introduced a no-confidence motion against the narrator's government.
Shaul Mofaz Military/Security Official
Recipient of a phone call from the narrator regarding potential violence.
Avi Dichter Head of the Shin Bet
Former Sayeret Matkal officer, recipient of a phone call from the narrator regarding potential violence.

Organizations (5)

Name Type Context
Knesset
Israeli Parliament, mentioned regarding a no-confidence vote and recess.
El Al
Airline operating the flight the narrator returned on.
Shin Bet
Israeli internal security service, headed by Avi Dichter.
Sayeret Matkal
Military unit formerly associated with Avi Dichter.
House Oversight Committee
Implied by Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.

Timeline (3 events)

July 2000 (Contextual)
Return flight from Camp David Summit
Mediterranean to Ben-Gurion Airport
Post-Camp David Summit
Knesset No-Confidence Vote
Knesset, Israel
Knesset Members Arik Sharon Ehud Barak
Post-Camp David Summit
Arafat's return to Gaza
Gaza

Locations (5)

Location Context
Central topic of negotiation and religious significance.
Arrival location in Israel.
Geographic feature flown over.
Location of the failed peace summit.
Location where Arafat returned.

Relationships (3)

Ehud Barak Political Adversaries / Negotiators Yasser Arafat
Discussion of failed peace deal and potential violence.
Ehud Barak Political Rivals Arik Sharon
Sharon introduced a no-confidence motion against Barak's government.
Ehud Barak Governmental/Superior-Subordinate Avi Dichter
Barak phoned Dichter (Head of Shin Bet) to give instructions.

Key Quotes (4)

"because for him, Jerusalem was sacred from a strictly national and historic point of view."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011847.jpg
Quote #1
"As our El Al 707 descended over the Mediterranean for our approach back to Ben-Gurion Airport, I faced the more immediate issue of ensuring my government survived."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011847.jpg
Quote #2
"Let’s hope the violence doesn’t come... But if it does, make sure we are ready."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011847.jpg
Quote #3
"Arik needed a majority of the Knesset’s 120 seats to bring down the government. The vote ended in a 50-50 tie."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011847.jpg
Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,281 characters)

/ BARAK / 90
“because for him, Jerusalem was sacred from a strictly national and historic point
of view.” It was for me as well. In fact, I think its religious significance probably
resonated more strongly. Still, the major change from the summit was that even
those Israelis who found a compromise on Jerusalem unacceptable recognized that,
if they did want to negotiate a definitive end to the conflict, talking about it was
unavoidable.
At least for now, however, there wasn’t going to be a peace deal. As our El Al
707 descended over the Mediterranean for our approach back to Ben-Gurion
Airport, I faced the more immediate issue of ensuring my government survived.
This was partly in case, against all odds, Arafat showed a readiness to revive the
search for peace – but also because of the real prospect he would choose violence
instead.
* * *
Since the Knesset was about to go into recess until late October, I would have a
three-month window to reshape and stabilize my coalition – but only if we could
weather a no-confidence motion introduced by Arik Sharon after Camp David. We
did weather it, barely. Arik needed a majority of the Knesset’s 120 seats to bring
down the government. The vote ended in a 50-50 tie. The other 20 MKs abstained,
or didn’t show up. This was not because of any enthusiasm for my efforts to get an
agreement at Camp David, but because of a lack of enthusiasm for an early
election in which they feared losing seats.
Still, that did allow me to focus on the challenge of the inevitably altered
situation with Arafat after the summit’s collapse. My main concern was the
possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I’d phoned Shaul Mofaz and
Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet.
“Let’s hope the violence doesn’t come,” I told them. “But if it does, make sure we
are ready.” Though there was no sign of violence in the weeks immediately after
the summit, there was equally little sign of diplomatic engagement by Arafat.
Obviously relieved at the way Camp David had ended, he returned to Gaza to a
hero’s welcome, proudly proclaiming that he had refused to “give up” Jerusalem. It
was vintage Arafat: the “general” in his starched uniform and kefiyeh, fresh from
376
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011847

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