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Extraction Summary
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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
720 KB
Summary
This document is a legal filing, specifically page 32 of a larger document, arguing the legal standard for scheduling a post-verdict hearing regarding potential juror misconduct by 'Juror 50'. It cites numerous precedents from the Second Circuit to establish that such a hearing is only warranted under strict conditions, requiring 'clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence' of impropriety, and is not meant to be a 'fishing expedition' for the defendant.
People (7)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Torres | Party in a cited legal case |
Cited in the case 'Torres, 128 F.3d at 48' regarding juror bias.
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| Juror 50 | Juror |
Subject of a section titled 'The Court Should Schedule a Limited Hearing Regarding Juror 50'.
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| Stewart | Party in a cited legal case |
Cited in the case 'United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 133 (2d Cir. 2009)' regarding juror misconduct.
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| Ianniello | Party in a cited legal case |
Cited in 'Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543' and 'Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 544' regarding standards for post-verdict hearings.
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| Baker | Party in a cited legal case |
Cited in the case 'United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2018)'.
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| Sun Myung Moon | Party in a cited legal case |
Cited in the case 'United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983)'.
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| Moten | Party in a cited legal case |
Cited in the case 'United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir. 1978)'.
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Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit | government agency |
Referenced as the court that has set legal precedent on juror bias and misconduct hearings.
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Timeline (1 events)
Key Quotes (6)
"confronting the legality of [her] own past acts as well."Source
— Torres case precedent
(Describing a situation where a juror's past conduct was similar to the charged offenses.)
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Quote #1
"clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence . . . that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred."Source
— United States v. Stewart case precedent
(Stating the standard for when a post-verdict hearing into alleged juror misconduct is proper.)
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Quote #2
"concrete allegations of inappropriate conduct that constitute competent and relevant evidence,"Source
— United States v. Baker case precedent
(Describing how the standard for a post-verdict hearing can be met.)
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Quote #3
"need not be irrebuttable because if the allegations were conclusive, there would be no need for a hearing."Source
— United States v. Baker case precedent
(Clarifying the nature of allegations required for a hearing.)
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Quote #4
"should be limited to only what is absolutely necessary to determine the facts with precision."Source
— Ianniello case precedent
(Emphasizing that the scope of an inquiry into juror misconduct must be narrowly tailored.)
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Quote #5
"A hearing is not held to afford a convicted defendant the opportunity to ‘conduct a fishing expedition.’"Source
— United States v. Sun Myung Moon case precedent
(Stating the purpose of a post-verdict hearing is not for defendants to search for new issues.)
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Quote #6
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,107 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 32 of 49
conduct which was similar to the charged offenses such that the juror may have felt that she was “confronting the legality of [her] own past acts as well.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 48. While the Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in inferring bias under the circumstances presented there, it also made clear that the district would not have erred in declining to infer bias. Id. Torres thus underscores the ample discretion which district judges have in striking jurors for cause—discretion which this Court has properly exercised not to infer bias where jurors have disclosed being victims of sexual abuse or harassment.
The defendant has failed to establish inferred bias.
The defendant has failed to establish inferred bias.
II. The Court Should Schedule a Limited Hearing Regarding Juror 50
A. Applicable Law
A post-verdict hearing into alleged juror misconduct is proper only where there is “clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence . . . that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred.” United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543). This standard can only be met by “concrete allegations of inappropriate conduct that constitute competent and relevant evidence,” though such allegations “need not be irrebuttable because if the allegations were conclusive, there would be no need for a hearing.” United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543).
In the rare instances where an inquiry into potential juror misconduct is warranted, the scope of the hearing must be narrowly tailored. The Second Circuit has emphasized that the inquiry “should be limited to only what is absolutely necessary to determine the facts with precision.” Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 544. “A hearing is not held to afford a convicted defendant the opportunity to ‘conduct a fishing expedition.’” United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir. 1978)). Instead,
A post-verdict hearing into alleged juror misconduct is proper only where there is “clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence . . . that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred.” United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543). This standard can only be met by “concrete allegations of inappropriate conduct that constitute competent and relevant evidence,” though such allegations “need not be irrebuttable because if the allegations were conclusive, there would be no need for a hearing.” United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543).
In the rare instances where an inquiry into potential juror misconduct is warranted, the scope of the hearing must be narrowly tailored. The Second Circuit has emphasized that the inquiry “should be limited to only what is absolutely necessary to determine the facts with precision.” Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 544. “A hearing is not held to afford a convicted defendant the opportunity to ‘conduct a fishing expedition.’” United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir. 1978)). Instead,
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