2020.09.22%20Reply%20Motion.pdf

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN
********************************
GHISLAINE MAXWELL, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. ST-20-CV-155
)
vs. )
)
ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, DARREN )
K. INDYKE, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF )
THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, )
RICHARD D. KAHN, in his capacity as )
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. )
EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a New York Limited )
Liability Company, )
Defendant. )
__________________________________________)
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS’
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE
The Government of the United States Virgin Islands (“Government”), by and through its
undersigned counsel, hereby submits this Reply Brief in support of its motion for an order
permitting the Government to intervene in this action as of right pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(a)
or else by leave pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Government states in further support of its
motion as follows.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Government moves to intervene in this action by Plaintiff Ghislaine Maxwell seeking
indemnification and advancement of legal expenses from Defendants the Estate of Jeffrey E.
Epstein and its Co-Executors—Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn—on two distinct but
closely related grounds. First, the Government has an interest in preserving Epstein Estate funds
to satisfy a judgment in its pending action against Defendants alleging that Epstein and others
IN THE SUP.ERJOR COURT
OFTHE VIRGI ISLAND
FILED
September 22, 2020
TAMARA CHARLES
CLERK OF THE COURT

engaged in a criminal sex-trafficking enterprise in the Virgin Islands for which the Government
seeks forfeiture, divestiture, disgorgement, and payment of civil penalties and damages under the
Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“CICO”), 14 V.I.C. §§ 601 et seq. Second,
the Government has an investigatory interest in Maxwell’s involvement with Epstein’s criminal
sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct pursuant to its authority under CICO, 14 V.I.C. § 612,
which Maxwell has thwarted by resisting and evading service of the Government’s investigatory
subpoena, even while she has invoked the jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands Courts to obtain
indemnification for the very same alleged conduct.
Maxwell opposes the Government’s motion to intervene on numerous grounds, none of
which have merit. First, Maxwell contends she lacks sufficient notice of the Government’s claims
because it failed to attach a pleading as required by V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(c). This is incorrect. The
Government attached as Exhibit A to its motion the Amended Complaint in its CICO action setting
forth all of its claims against Defendants and the factual bases therefor. The CICO Complaint
serves Rule 24’s purpose of giving the parties notice of what the Government’s claims and interests
are. See, e.g., U.S. v. Metro St. Louis Sewer Dist., 589 F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Appellees
argue that MIEC’s failure to submit a pleading is sufficient to deny its motion to intervene, but we
conclude that the statement of interest satisfies Rule 24(c) because it provides sufficient notice to
the court and the parties of MIEC’s interests.”); Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199,
1236 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The Government and Microsoft make no claim they had inadequate
notice of the intervenors’ appeal, and we find no reason to bar intervention based solely upon this
technical [lack of pleading] defect, if defect it be.”). Maxwell and the Epstein Estate have ample
notice of the Government’s claims and interests.

Second, Maxwell argues that the Government’s pending CICO claims against Defendants
do not provide a sufficient interest because they are contingent, not yet having been litigated to
judgment. Maxwell relies almost entirely on federal court cases within the Third Circuit for this
argument. These cases are not controlling. See Bruni v. Alger, 71 V.I. 71, 76 n.11 (Super. Ct.
2019) (decisions interpreting federal rules of procedure are persuasive, not binding, authority as to
analogous Virgin Islands Rules provisions). Here, far more persuasive are decisions in at least six
other federal Circuits rejecting the Third Circuit’s analysis and holding that a pending claim may
provide a sufficient interest for intervention in the defendant’s coverage action. See, e.g., Utahns
for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dept. of Tramsp., 295 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The threat
of economic injury from the outcome of litigation undoubtedly gives a petitioner the requisite
interest [in intervention as of right].”); Security Ins. Co. v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1380-
81 (7th Cir. 1995); Teague v. Baker, 931 F.2d 259, 261 (4th Cir. 1991); TIG Specialty Ins. Co. v.
Fin. Web.com, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 336, 338 (M.D. Fla. 2002); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Summit-Warren Ind’s Co., 143 F.R.D. 129, 134 (N.D. Ohio 1992); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Greaves, 110 F.R.D. 549, 552 (D.R.I. 1986). The Government has a clear and sufficient interest
in the outcome of this action.
Third, Maxwell argues that intervention is unnecessary because the Government’s interest
in ensuring availability of the Epstein Estate’s funds is secured by the Government’s Criminal
Activity Liens placed pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 610. This is incorrect because the Government’s
Criminal Activity Liens under CICO are limited to Epstein’s funds or property situated or owned
in the Virgin Islands, see 14 V.I.C. § 610(e)(1)-(2), and because the Epstein Estate is fighting
enforcement of the Government’s Liens at every turn. See Exhibit M hereto (Letter of Counsel
for Epstein Estate and Co-Executors to Probate Court, Sept. 15, 2020) at 2 (“[W]e urgently ask the

Court to . . . issue an Order for the Attorney General to release the liens on the Estate’s FirstBank
account in the amount [$7,200,000] requested in the Estate’s correspondence with the Attorney
General.”).
Finally, Maxwell argues that the Government’s interest in the outcome of this case is
adequately protected by the Epstein Estate’s interest in protecting its own funds. This, too, is
incorrect. Numerous of the above-cited federal courts reject the same argument that the parties to
a coverage action can adequately represent the interests of a tort claimant. See, e.g., Security Ins.,
69 F.3d at 1381; Teague, 931 F.3d at 262. Here, the Epstein Estate and its Co-Executors clearly
are inadequate to represent the Government’s interest in preserving Estate funds because
• Maxwell herself pleads that “Indyke, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate, also
made assurances to Maxwell that Maxwell’s legal fees and obligations would be
reimbursed by Epstein and the Estate . . . .” Complaint, ¶ 21; and
• Indyke and Kahn admit that “the Estate is indemnifying certain current and former
employees of and professionals on behalf of one or more defendants in the Attorney
General’s suit.” Ex. M (Letter of Counsel for Epstein Estate and Co-Executors to
Probate Court, Sept. 15, 2020) at 2.
There thus is no question that the Co-Executors are not acting to preserve Estate funds. The
Government’s interest in preservation thus is not adequately represented by the Epstein Estate or
its Co-Executors, the Defendants in the Government’s CICO enforcement action.
For all of these reasons and as set forth more fully below, the Court should grant the
Government’s motion to intervene.
ARGUMENT
A. The Motion Gives Ample Notice of the Government’s Claims and Interests.
Maxwell begins her opposition by arguing that the Government’s motion to intervene is
“procedurally defective” because it does not attach a pleading as required by Rule 24(c) and that,
because of this alleged failure, the motion “does not adequately provide notice to Plaintiff of the

precise nature of [the Government’s] claims.” Opposition at 3-4. This argument is factually
and/or legally incorrect.
Rule 24 provides that a motion to intervene “must state the grounds for intervention and be
accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.”
V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(c). The Government satisfied this requirement by attaching as Exhibit A to its
motion its First Amended Complaint in its CICO action against Defendants the Epstein Estate and
its Co-Executors and others. The CICO Complaint is 54 pages, contains 114 paragraphs of factual
allegations, and states 24 separate counts setting forth the legal grounds for each item of relief the
Government seeks from Defendants. The Government also attached as Exhibit B its CICO
Subpoena Duces Tecum, the service of which Maxwell previously resisted and evaded, which
states clearly that the Government is seeking documents from her related to “the rape, abuse,
exploitation and trafficking of young women and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his
associates” in violation of Virgin Islands law. Maxwell does not even address the Government’s
submission of its CICO Complaint or Subpoena, let alone explain how or why they do not satisfy
the Rule’s requirement of a pleading to give notice of interest.
Since Maxwell ignores the Government’s attached CICO Complaint and Subpoena, she
does not address whether or how Rule 24(c) contemplates something different. But even if it did,
this would be purely a matter of form, not substance, because the CICO Complaint and subpoena
clearly satisfy the pleading provision’s purpose—to give the litigating parties notice of the
intervening party’s claims and interest. See generally In re L.O.F., 62 V.I. 655, 665 (2015) (“It is
a settled rule that in the construction of statutes an interpretation is never to be adopted that would
defeat the purpose of the enactment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

This is the conclusion reached by numerous federal circuit courts of appeal in applying the
identical pleading provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). See Peaje Invs. LLC v. Garcia-Padilla, 845
F.3d 505, 515 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Accordingly, denial of a motion to intervene based solely on the
movant’s failure to attach a pleading, absent prejudice to any party, constitutes an abuse of
discretion.”); Metro St. Louis, supra, 569 F.3d at 834 (“[T]he statement of interest satisfies Rule
24(c) because it provides sufficient notice to the court and the parties of MIEC’s interests.”);
Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale Comm., Ltd., 425 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Furthermore, neither party has ever claimed that any prejudice would result from granting the
motion to intervene despite the failure to attach a pleading; the parties are clearly on notice as to
Hillandale Committee’s position and arguments.”); Mass. v. Microsoft, supra, 373 F.3d at 1236
n.19 (“The Government and Microsoft make no claim they had inadequate notice of the
intervenors’ appeal, and we find no reason to bar intervention based solely upon this technical
defect, if defect it be.”).
Since Maxwell cannot plausibly claim lack of notice of the Government’s interests in
preservation of the Epstein Estate’s funds and in service of its CICO investigatory subpoena, her
argument for denial of intervention based upon Rule 24(c) fails and should be rejected.
B. The Government Has a Clear and Sufficient Interest in the Outcome of this
Action.
Maxwell next argues that the Government’s interest in preservation of Epstein Estate funds
is insufficient for intervention because the interest is “contingent” until a judgment is entered in
the Government’s CICO action against the Estate. The Court should reject this argument because
it relies upon an overly rigid and stringent conception of the “interest” that supports intervention
as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).

Maxwell cites as support for her argument decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, which was bound
by Third Circuit precedent. See Opposition at 6-7 (citing Mountain Top Condo Ass’n v. Dave
Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 261, 366 (3d Cir. 1995); Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. V.I. Port
Auth., 224 F.R.D. 372, 375-76 (D.V.I. 2004)). These decisions, however, both applying Federal
Rule 24, are not controlling on this Court’s application of Virgin Islands Rule 24. See, e.g., Bruni
v. Alger, supra, 71 V.I. at 76 n.11 (decisions applying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
persuasive, not binding authority, as to analogous Virgin Islands Rules).
Here, the Court should not find the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Federal Rule 24
persuasive because it is contrary to decisions of courts in at least six other federal circuits—the
First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits—which find that the holder of a
pending claim may have a sufficient interest to intervene in a related coverage case. See Utahns
for Better Transp., supra, 295 F.3d at 1115 (“The threat of economic injury from the outcome of
litigation undoubtedly gives a petition the requisite interest” to intervene); Security Ins. Co., supra,
69 F.3d at 1380-81 (affirming grant of intervention by tort claimant in coverage action); Teague,
supra, 931 F.2d at 261 (“[O]ther [courts] have allowed intervention in a dispute between an insurer
and its insured even when the intervenor’s interest is contingent on the outcome of other litigation.
We find the reasoning of this latter authority persuasive.”) (citations omitted); TIG Specialty Ins.
Co., supra, 208 F.R.D. at 338 (potential deprivation of source of recovery if intervenor prevails on
its claim is a sufficient interest); St. Paul Fire & Marine, supra, 143 F.R.D. at 134 (“There is
nothing in the wording or history of Rule 24 which indicates intent to exclude would be intervenors
whose interest in the pending litigation is not yet vested.”) (quoting New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
supra, 110 F.R.D. at 552); see also Romero v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 313 F.R.D. 133, 140 (D.N.M.

2016) (“[T]he Tenth Circuit and numerous other Courts of Appeal have permitted intervenors with
a contingent interest to intervene.”).
In Teague, supra, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that class action
plaintiffs seeking to intervene in a coverage action involving the class action defendant had a
sufficient interest because they “stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the district
court’s judgment” in the coverage case. 931 F.2d at 261. That same conclusion applies here. If
this Court rules that the Epstein Estate must indemnify Maxwell for claims related to her
relationship with Epstein and to “advance” her attorneys’ fees (while she is in prison awaiting trial
on federal criminal charges), then the Government stands to lose funds for the satisfaction of a
judgment in its CICO action against the Epstein Estate.
Maxwell also argues that the Government’s separate but related investigatory interest under
CICO as to her involvement with Epstein’s conduct is not sufficient to support intervention. See
Opposition at 12-14. Maxwell focuses primarily on the Government’s ability to enforce its CICO
subpoena by other means, rather than on the investigatory interest itself. The Government’s
interest is established by statute, 14 V.I.C. § 612(a), and involves the same subject matter as this
action—Maxwell’s relationship to the Epstein Enterprise’s conduct. Compare Maxwell
Complaint, ¶ 1 (“This is an action for indemnification for and advancement of the attorneys’ fees,
security costs, costs to find safe accommodation, and all other expenses Maxwell has reasonably
incurred and will incur by reason of her employment relationship with Jeffrey E. Epstein
(‘Epstein’) and his affiliated businesses . . . .”); with Gov’t Ex. B (CICO Subpoena) (seeking
documents from Maxwell related to “the rape, abuse, exploitation and trafficking of young women
and underage girls by Jeffrey E. Epstein and his associates” in violation of Virgin Islands law).
This related interest thus provides an additional basis supporting the Government’s intervention.

Based on the substantial weight and persuasive force of the foregoing authority applying
the analogous federal rules provision, the Court should hold that the Government’s pending CICO
claims against the Epstein Estate provide it with a clear and sufficient interest to intervene to ensure
preservation of Estate funds.
C. The Government’s Interest in Preserving Epstein Estate Funds for Payment
of a Judgment May Be Impaired Absent Allowance of Intervention.
Maxwell separately argues that the Government’s interest in preservation of Epstein Estate
funds will not be impaired by any judgment or resolution of this action because the Government
has placed Criminal Activity Liens on certain Estate assets pursuant to 14 V.I.C. § 610. See
Opposition at 10-11. The Court should reject this argument because it ignores the difference in
scope between all Epstein Estate assets and those covered by the Government’s Criminal Activity
Liens.
CICO’s Criminal Activity Lien provisions permit the Government to place liens upon a
CICO defendant’s property that is “situated in the Territory of the Virgin Islands” or its “beneficial
interest” that is “located in the Territory of the Virgin Islands.” 14 V.I.C. § 610(e)(1)-(2). Maxwell
acknowledges this territorial limitation. See Opposition at 10 (“These liens cover all real and
personal property located in the Virgin Islands in the name or under the signatory authority of
the Estate.”) (emphasis in original).
The Government’s claims for forfeiture, divestiture, maximum civil penalties per violation,
treble and punitive damages, and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains under CICO, see Ex. A-CICO
Complaint at 53-54 (Prayer for Relief), are not so limited. See 14 V.I.C. § 607(c), (e) (provisions
for awarding damages and civil penalties, without territorial limit).
Since the Epstein Estate assets covered by the Government’s Criminal Activity Liens are
not co-extensive with the relief the Government may obtain through a judgment on its CICO

claims, the Court should reject Maxwell’s argument that the Liens alone are sufficient to secure
the Government’s interests without intervention.
Although the foregoing suffices to reject Maxwell’s argument, it also bears emphasis that
Defendants the Epstein Estate and its Co-Executors are resisting and seeking to evade the
Government’s Criminal Activity Liens at every turn. As just one example, even though the
Attorney General and the Superior Court in the CICO action have sole and exclusive authority to
release funds covered by the Liens, see 14 V.I.C. § 610(r) (Attorney General’s authority), (t)
(CICO Court’s authority), the Co-Executors repeatedly have asked and currently are asking the
Probate Court to order release of over $7,000,000 covered by the Government’s Criminal Activity
Liens. See Ex. M hereto (Letter of Counsel for Epstein Estate and Co-Executors to Probate Court,
Sept. 15, 2020) at 2 (“[W]e urgently ask the Court to . . . issue an Order for the Attorney General
to release the liens on the Estate’s FirstBank account in the amount [$7,200,000] requested in the
Estate’s correspondence with the Attorney General.”). While these requests have no legal merit,
their existence is at least relevant to Maxwell’s assertion that the Government’s interest are
absolutely secured by the Criminal Activity Liens.
Maxwell also argues that the Government’s investigatory interest under CICO as to her
involvement with Epstein’s conduct will not be impaired absent intervention because the
Government may protect this interest by other means—by enforcing its CICO subpoena in the
state where she resides. See Opposition at 14 (citing 14 V.I.C. § 612(k)). In so arguing, Maxwell
admits that she avoided service of the Government’s CICO Subpoena by refusing to authorize her
attorney in the Virgin Islands to accept service. See Opposition at 14 (Government’s subpoenas
“were served to persons who did not have authority to accept them.”). She also does not deny that
she resisted or evaded service in the, previously unknown, state where she resided prior to her

arrest. See Gov’t Motion at 4-6. She also does not consent to service or to a court’s personal
jurisdiction over her as a citizen of New York where she is imprisoned. She has, however,
consented to this Court’s jurisdiction over her claims related to her relationship with Jeffrey
Epstein. This action in this Court thus is the one venue in which the Government’s investigatory
interest is certain not to be impaired.
For all of these reasons, the Court should reject Maxwell’s argument and should hold that
the Government’s interests in preservation of Epstein Estate funds and in advancement of its
investigation of Maxwell may be impaired absent intervention.
D. The Epstein Estate Does Not Adequately Represent the Government’s
Interests.
Maxwell also argues that the Government may not intervene because the Epstein Estate
and its Co-Executors, in her telling, share and thus adequately represent the Government’s interest
in preserving Estate funds. See Opposition at 15-17 (“To the extent that the Government is
concerned with the dissipation of the Estate’s assets, the Trustees adequately represent the
Government’s interest here.”). They do not.
Maxwell’s own Complaint allegations undercut this argument. As one of the grounds for
her alleged right to indemnification and advancement of legal costs, Maxwell alleges that separate
and apart from Epstein’s promises, Defendant “Indyke, in his capacity as an Executor of the Estate,
also made assurances to Maxwell that Maxwell’s legal fees and obligations would be reimbursed
by Epstein and the Estate, and that Maxwell’s legal fees and expenses would be paid going
forward.” Complaint, ¶ 21 (emphasis added). How this promise by Indyke squares with his
“fiduciary duties to all who may have a beneficial interest in the estate,” Opposition at 15, or to
otherwise preserve Epstein Estate funds, Maxwell does not say.

Nonetheless, her allegation that Indyke is offering up Epstein Estate funds for the legal
defense of persons not specifically identified as Estate beneficiaries is borne out by Indyke and
Kahn’s recent admission to the Probate Court that this is exactly what they are doing. Their
counsel’s September 15, 2020 letter to the Probate Court acknowledges that “the Estate is
indemnifying certain current and former employees of and professionals on behalf of one or more
defendants in the Attorney General’s suit.” Ex. M hereto (Sept. 15, 2020 letter) at 2. Specifically,
the Government has learned that the Estate is paying the legal fees for an immigration attorney it
believes may have obtained visas for Epstein’s trafficking victims. Paying the legal fees of
individuals alleged to have participated in Epstein’s trafficking enterprise demonstrates the
Estate’s interest in preventing the disclosure of information relevant to the Government’s case in
the Government’s case, and belies Maxwell’s assertion that the Government’s and the Estate’s
interests in preservation of funds are perfectly aligned.
At risk of stating the obvious, the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein and its Co-Executors are not
adequate representatives for the Government’s interest in preserving the availability of Estate
funds to satisfy a CICO action judgment based upon Epstein’s sex-trafficking and other related
criminal conduct. The Court therefore should grant the Government intervention as of right under
Rule 24(a).
E. The Government Also Satisfies Rule 24(b)’s Requirements for Permissive
Intervention.
Maxwell’s arguments for denying permissive intervention pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b)
also have no merit and should be rejected if intervention as of right is denied (which it should not
be).
Maxwell first argues that permissive intervention should be denied because the
Government’s claims do not share “a common question of law or fact,” V.I. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B),

with the claims in her indemnification action. See Opposition at 17. This is incorrect. The
Government’s CICO claims against Defendants, its investigated claims against Maxwell, and
Maxwell’s claims against Defendants all present the common question of: Who is liable to pay a
judgment on the Government’s CICO claims against Defendants (and/or Maxwell) for their
involvement in or connection to the rape, abuse, exploitation, and trafficking of young women and
underage girls by Epstein and his associates?
Numerous federal courts have addressed the question of whether a tort claim and an
indemnification claim present a common question of law or fact, and concluded that they do. See
Security Ins. Co., supra, 69 F.3d at 1381 (common question and independent jurisdiction
requirements “are clearly met in this case”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l REO Mgmt., Inc.,
205 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Thus, while the insurance contract may not be an issue in the
underlying case in Superior Court, the factual similarities between the two cases are enough to
establish a common question of fact. Specifically, both the present case and the underlying case
arise from alleged carbon monoxide emissions from a furnace in the defendant’s building that
began on February 23, 1995. In addition, neither case can be decided without determining the
source of the applicant’s injuries. Accordingly, for purposes of [Federal] Rule 24(b), the court
finds a common question of fact in the present lawsuit and the underlying lawsuit in Superior
Court.”). This Court should hold the same here.
Maxwell’s next and final argument is that the Government’s intervention will cause undue
delay and prejudice because the Government “proposes to inject legal issues that diverge
substantially from those involved in this indemnification action.” Opposition at 18. Not so.
The only such issues Maxwell identifies are those “concerning the Government’s intent to
conduct a criminal investigation of Plaintiff within the context of this civil action.” Id. This

question, however, would be answered by the intervention itself. Once intervention is granted, the
Government will seek to: (a) oppose unauthorized expenditures of Epstein Estate’s funds, which
Maxwell contends already is or should be the Estate’s position, see Opposition at 16; and (b)
enforce its investigatory subpoena against Maxwell, which raises a discrete question clearly
answered under 14 V.I.C. § 612(a), as Maxwell also appears to recognize (but nonetheless wants
to be answered in any other court where she has not yet consented to jurisdiction), see Opposition
at 13-14.
At bottom, the only thing the Government’s intervention threatens is to provide facts
answering the questions already raised by Maxwell’s indemnification claim in this action.
Maxwell seeks indemnification from the Epstein Estate based upon her purported “prior
employment relationship” with Epstein and his businesses in connection with any claim “related
to Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims.” Complaint, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
The Epstein Estate’s Co-Executors already are “indemnifying certain current and former
employees of and professionals on behalf of” Epstein’s companies. Ex. M (Sept. 15, 2020 letter
to Probate Court). Only the Government stands at the ready to determine:
• what actual conduct by Epstein and Maxwell is at issue in connection with claims
by Epstein’s “alleged victims;”
• whether the criminal sex-trafficking and sexual abuse conduct that is alleged would
fall within the scope of any purported employment relationship; and/or
• whether, employment relationship or no, it is a legitimate expenditure of Epstein
Estate funds to provide legal representation to persons connected to an alleged
criminal sex-trafficking enterprise instead of preserving funds for the Estate’s true
beneficiaries and claimants.
Thus, rather than unduly complicate this litigation, the Government’s intervention would guide it
towards a fact-based resolution of the issues Maxwell’s indemnification claims actually present.

For each of these reasons, the Court should grant permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)
if intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) is denied (which it should not be).
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth herein and in the moving papers, the Court should grant the
Government’s motion to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) or else by permission under Rule
24(b).
Respectfully submitted,
DENISE N. GEORGE, ESQUIRE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dated: September 22, 2020 By: /S/ Carol Thomas-Jacobs
CAROL THOMAS-JACOBS, ESQ.
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Virgin Islands Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
3438 Kronprindsens Gade
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands 00802
Email: carol.jacobs@doj.vi.gov
(340) 774-5666 ext. 10101
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the foregoing Reply Brief in Support of Motion to
Intervene complies with the word and page requirements of V.I.R. Civ. P. 6-1(e) and a true and
correct copy of the Motion was served via regular mail, postage prepaid, with a courtesy copy sent
by email to counsel of record on September 22, 2020 to:
KYLE R. WALDNER, ESQ.
QUINTAIROS, PRIETO, WOOD & BOYER, P.A.
9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4th Floor
Miami, FL 33156
E-mail: kwaldner@qpwblaw.com
DAVID CATTIE, ESQ.
THE CATTIE LAW FIRM, P.C.
1710 Kongens Gade
St. Thomas, V.I., 00802
e-mail: david.cattie@cattie-law.com
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN KROBLIN, ESQ.
ANDREW W. HEYMANN, ESQ.,
WILLIAM BLUM, ESQ.
SHARI D’ANDRADE, ESQ.
KELLERHALS FERGUSON KROBLIN PLLC
Royal Palms Professional Building
9053 Estate Thomas, Suite 101
St. Thomas, V.I. 00802-3602
Email: ckroblin@kellfer.com
aheymann@solblum.com
wblum@solblum.com
sdandrade@kellfer.com
mwhalen@kellfer.com
ANDREW TOMBACK
McLaughlin & Stern, LLP
260 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10016
United States
Email: ATomback@mclaughlinstern.com
DANIEL WEINER
MARC A. WEINSTEIN
HUGHES HUBBARD & REID, LLP
One Battery Park Plaza
New York, NY 10004-1482
United States
Email: daniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com
marc.weinstein@hugheshubbard.com
/S/ Carol Thomas-Jacobs
CAROL THOMAS-JACOBS, ESQ.
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Virgin Islands Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
3438 Kronprindsens Gade
St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands 00802
Email: carol.jacobs@doj.vi.gov
(340) 774-5666 ext. 10101