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Extraction Summary
2
People
2
Organizations
2
Locations
1
Events
1
Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
711 KB
Summary
This document is a page from a court order filed on December 30, 2020, in case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN. The Court denies the Defendant's motion for bail, explaining that under the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. § 3142), a presumption in favor of detention applies because the Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for an offense involving a minor victim. The document cites case law (Contreras and Jessup) to affirm that an indictment establishes probable cause and places a limited burden on the Defendant to produce evidence to counter the presumption of detention.
Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| The Court | Government agency |
The judicial body that denies the Defendant's motion for bail.
|
| United States | Government |
Named as a party in the cited cases, United States v. Contreras and United States v. Jessup.
|
Relationships (1)
The Court is ruling on the Defendant's motion for bail, establishing an adversarial relationship within a legal proceeding.
Key Quotes (5)
"it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed."Source
— 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E)
(Quoted from the Bail Reform Act to establish the presumption in favor of detention.)
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Quote #1
"conclusively determines the existence of probable cause"Source
— United States v. Contreras
(Describing the legal effect of an indictment returned by a properly constituted grand jury.)
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Quote #2
"the return of an indictment eliminates the need for a preliminary examination at which a probable cause finding is made by a judicial officer pursuant to Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."Source
— United States v. Contreras
(Explaining why a grand jury indictment removes the need for a separate preliminary hearing for probable cause.)
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Quote #3
"tending to counter the § 3142(e) presumption of flight,"Source
— Contreras, 776 F.2d at 53 n.1
(Describing the limited burden of production that the Defendant bears when the presumption of detention applies.)
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Quote #4
"introduce a certain amount of evidence contrary to the presumed fact."Source
— United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380
(Defining what is required by the Defendant's burden of production.)
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Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,096 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 7 of 22
detention without bail is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The Court accordingly denies
Defendant’s request to reopen the original bail hearing and denies her renewed motion for bail.
Defendant’s request to reopen the original bail hearing and denies her renewed motion for bail.
A. The presumption in favor of detention applies
The Court is required to presume that no condition or combination of conditions of
pretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance. The Bail Reform Act
provides that if a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, “it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the
community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person
committed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). The Defendant’s indictment by a grand jury suffices to
establish that there is probable cause to believe that she committed the offenses charged in the
indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that
that an indictment returned by a properly constituted grand jury “conclusively determines the
existence of probable cause” and that “the return of an indictment eliminates the need for a
preliminary examination at which a probable cause finding is made by a judicial officer pursuant
to Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (citations omitted)). In light of the
crimes charged in the indictment, the Court begins with the presumption that no condition or
combination of conditions of pretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance.
pretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance. The Bail Reform Act
provides that if a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, “it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the
community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person
committed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). The Defendant’s indictment by a grand jury suffices to
establish that there is probable cause to believe that she committed the offenses charged in the
indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that
that an indictment returned by a properly constituted grand jury “conclusively determines the
existence of probable cause” and that “the return of an indictment eliminates the need for a
preliminary examination at which a probable cause finding is made by a judicial officer pursuant
to Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (citations omitted)). In light of the
crimes charged in the indictment, the Court begins with the presumption that no condition or
combination of conditions of pretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance.
When the presumption applies, the Defendant bears a limited burden of production
“tending to counter the § 3142(e) presumption of flight,” Contreras, 776 F.2d at 53 n.1. The
Defendant’s burden of production only requires that she “introduce a certain amount of evidence
contrary to the presumed fact.” United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380 (1st Cir. 1985),
“tending to counter the § 3142(e) presumption of flight,” Contreras, 776 F.2d at 53 n.1. The
Defendant’s burden of production only requires that she “introduce a certain amount of evidence
contrary to the presumed fact.” United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380 (1st Cir. 1985),
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