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1.64 MB

Extraction Summary

5
People
7
Organizations
5
Locations
3
Events
4
Relationships
3
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Book page / government document
File Size: 1.64 MB
Summary

This page discusses the handling of Edward Snowden by Russian intelligence services, suggesting he was likely debriefed extensively rather than just passing through. It details the geopolitical consequences, including the cancellation of a summit between Obama and Putin, and asserts that despite Snowden's self-image as a whistleblower, Russian services viewed him as an espionage source to be exploited.

Organizations (7)

Name Type Context
GRU
Russian military intelligence service
NSA
SVR
Russian intelligence services
U.S. communications intelligence
Obama administration

Timeline (3 events)

Snowden's debriefing
Pre-Olympics summit cancellation
Snowden exfiltration

Locations (5)

Relationships (4)

to
to

Key Quotes (3)

"“This debriefing could not be done overnight,” according to a former high-ranking officer in the GRU"
Source
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Quote #1
"“There is no way that Snowden would not be fully debriefed,” he said."
Source
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Quote #2
"While he might continue to see himself as a whistleblower on a supranational scale, as far as Russian intelligence was concerned, he was an espionage source."
Source
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Quote #3

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,423 characters)

The Espionage Source | 287
held incommunicado in Vienna for two weeks during his debriefing. It would be inconceivable for an intelligence service to bring a potential espionage source such as Snowden to Russia and allow him to catch the next plane to Latin America. The false report provided to the press that Snowden was flying there was likely nothing more than a smoke screen to confuse foreign observers while he was receiving his initial debriefing and evaluation.
When it comes to the esoteric enterprise of reconstructing the work of U.S. communications intelligence, military as well as civilian experts in cryptology, computer sciences, and communications are necessary. Unlike in the case of Pelton, Snowden, according to Anatoly Kucherena, had secret material in his possession. Even if Russian intelligence had already acquired copies of the electronic files prior to Snowden’s arrival in Moscow, Snowden’s interpretation of them would be part of the debriefing because intelligence data needs to be put in context.
“This debriefing could not be done overnight,” according to a former high-ranking officer in the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service. “There is no way that Snowden would not be fully debriefed,” he said. He also said GRU specialists in signals intelligence would be called in.
Putin’s approval of the Snowden operation was not without consequences. Not only did Obama make good on his threat to cancel the pre-Olympics summit with Putin, but also, as it turned out, the Snowden exfiltration proved a turning point in the “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations. Having to accept the onus of declining relations with the Obama administration, Putin, it seems safe to assume, attempted to get the bonus of the NSA’s communications intelligence from Snowden. The GRU, the SVR, and other Russian intelligence services would not stop questioning Snowden, even if it took years, until they had squeezed out of him whatever state secrets he had. Because Snowden was rewarded with sanctuary, a residence, and bodyguards, there is no reason to doubt that he refused to accommodate his hosts. While he might continue to see himself as a whistleblower on a supranational scale, as far as Russian intelligence was concerned, he was an espionage source.
For an intelligence service, the game is not over when it obtains
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9/30/16 8:13 AM
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