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2.55 MB
Extraction Summary
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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Geopolitical/military analysis report page
File Size:
2.55 MB
Summary
This document analyzes Israel's military geography and strategic positioning, arguing that despite a lack of strategic depth, Israel benefits from "interior lines" that allow it to rapidly move forces between fronts against Egypt and Syria. It further suggests that a coordinated attack is unlikely because Syria would view an expansionist Egypt controlling Israel as a greater threat than Israel itself.
Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| House Oversight Committee |
Key Quotes (3)
"On the surface, Israel lacks strategic depth, but this is true only on the surface."Source
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Quote #1
"However, even here the Israelis have the tremendous advantage of fighting on interior lines."Source
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Quote #2
"From Syria's point of view, the only thing more dangerous than Israel is an Egypt in control of Israel."Source
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Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,031 characters)
30
deploys on the plain.
On the surface, Israel lacks strategic depth, but this is true only on the
surface. It faces limited threats from southern neighbors. To its east,
it faces only a narrow strip of populated area east of the Jordan. To
the north, there is a maritime commercial entity. Syria operating
alone, forced through the narrow gap of the Mount Hermon-Galilee
line and operating on extended supply lines, can be dealt with readily.
There is a risk of simultaneous attacks from multiple directions.
Depending on the forces deployed and the degree of coordination
between them, this can pose a problem for Israel. However, even here
the Israelis have the tremendous advantage of fighting on interior
lines. Egypt and Syria, fighting on external lines (and widely
separated fronts), would have enormous difficulty transferring forces
from one front to another. Israel, on interior lines (fronts close to
each other with good transportation), would be able to move its
forces from front to front rapidly, allowing for sequential engagement
and thereby the defeat of enemies. Unless enemies are carefully
coordinated and initiate war simultaneously — and deploy
substantially superior force on at least one front — Israel can initiate
war at a time of its choosing or else move its forces rapidly between
fronts, negating much of the advantage of size that the attackers
might have.
There is another aspect to the problem of multifront war. Egypt
usually has minimal interests along the Levant, having its own coast
and an orientation to the south toward the headwaters of the Nile. On
the rare occasions when Egypt does move through the Sinai and
attacks to the north and northeast, it is in an expansionary mode. By
the time it consolidates and exploits the coastal plain, it would be
powerful enough to threaten Syria. From Syria's point of view, the
only thing more dangerous than Israel is an Egypt in control of Israel.
Therefore, the probability of a coordinated north-south strike at Israel
On the surface, Israel lacks strategic depth, but this is true only on the
surface. It faces limited threats from southern neighbors. To its east,
it faces only a narrow strip of populated area east of the Jordan. To
the north, there is a maritime commercial entity. Syria operating
alone, forced through the narrow gap of the Mount Hermon-Galilee
line and operating on extended supply lines, can be dealt with readily.
There is a risk of simultaneous attacks from multiple directions.
Depending on the forces deployed and the degree of coordination
between them, this can pose a problem for Israel. However, even here
the Israelis have the tremendous advantage of fighting on interior
lines. Egypt and Syria, fighting on external lines (and widely
separated fronts), would have enormous difficulty transferring forces
from one front to another. Israel, on interior lines (fronts close to
each other with good transportation), would be able to move its
forces from front to front rapidly, allowing for sequential engagement
and thereby the defeat of enemies. Unless enemies are carefully
coordinated and initiate war simultaneously — and deploy
substantially superior force on at least one front — Israel can initiate
war at a time of its choosing or else move its forces rapidly between
fronts, negating much of the advantage of size that the attackers
might have.
There is another aspect to the problem of multifront war. Egypt
usually has minimal interests along the Levant, having its own coast
and an orientation to the south toward the headwaters of the Nile. On
the rare occasions when Egypt does move through the Sinai and
attacks to the north and northeast, it is in an expansionary mode. By
the time it consolidates and exploits the coastal plain, it would be
powerful enough to threaten Syria. From Syria's point of view, the
only thing more dangerous than Israel is an Egypt in control of Israel.
Therefore, the probability of a coordinated north-south strike at Israel
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031863
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