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United States also agrees that it will not institute crim-
inal char[g]es against any potential co-conspirators of
Epstein, including but not limited to" four of Epstein's
assistants. Pet. App. 31a; see Pet. 3-4. But "[n]onprose-
cution agreements, like plea bargains, are contractual
in nature, and are therefore interpreted in accordance
with general principles of contract law." United States
v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1998); cf. San-
tobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). And like
other contracts, the NPA "must be read as a whole" and
in proper context. United States v. Moreno-Membache,
995 F.3d 249, 256 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
While "the United States" could conceivably refer to
the entire federal government, as petitioner urges, the
entirety and context of the NPA here make clear that
the term is used as it often is—as one alternative way
to refer to the USAO executing the agreement. See Pet.
App. 56a (noting that "the United States” is "common
shorthand" for the USAO); United States v. Trevino,
556 F.2d 1265, 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (interpreting "the
United States" in a statute to mean "the prosecutorial
division of the government") (emphasis omitted); cf.
United States v. Rourke, 74 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir.)
("within the criminal justice system throughout the
country, the term 'the government' is widely used and
understood to refer to the 'prosecution,' or 'the United
States Attorney"), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1215 (1996).
Among other things, the NPA invoked “the authority of
R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of Florida," and listed only officials of
that USAO in the signature block, Pet. App. 26a; see id.
at 33a-34a, 36a-38a-showing that the agreement was
with the USAO, not the entire DOJ.
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