HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_024612.jpg

21

after initially downplaying democracy promotion, the administration
seems to have begun to pursue it with new energy, partly under the
influence of Chinese dissidents and partly, insiders say, because
officials are reluctant to be portrayed as China apologists. Whatever
the motivation, Beijing is likely to view this combination of external
and internal pressure as a serious threat.
Meanwhile, if the White House is seriously seeking to contain China
or, alternatively, to shape a global environment that would make
containment unnecessary, it is hard to imagine how this could be
done without precluding any rapprochement between Moscow and
Beijing. The administration claims the reset with Russia is one of its
most significant foreign-policy successes. But there is less here than
meets the eye—on both sides. Russian concessions so far have been
halfhearted and Russian policies, whether on Iran or Libya, do not
coincide with those of America. For its part, the United States
appears unprepared to address Moscow’s greatest concerns:
integration into Europe’s security architecture and reliable assurances
on missile defense.
More narrowly—but no less problematic for U.S. efforts to have
better relations with Russia than Russia has with China—Obama’s
team is risking alienating a large portion of the Russian elite in its
response to corruption and human-rights violations. While the State
Department has made clear its opposition to legislation punishing
Russian officials allegedly linked to the death of lawyer Sergei
Magnitsky while in police custody, the administration has decided
preemptively to deny visas to those it considers implicated in the
case. Moscow has stated clearly that this could derail cooperation
across the board, including on sanctions against Iran and transit to
Afghanistan (a deal that becomes even more important as U.S. ties to
Pakistan deteriorate).

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_024612