HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020613.jpg

1.9 MB

Extraction Summary

3
People
8
Organizations
5
Locations
1
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Congressional report / oversight committee appendix
File Size: 1.9 MB
Summary

This document appears to be a page from a report (possibly House Oversight Committee based on the footer) discussing Chinese influence in Canada. It focuses on two main areas: the debate over allowing Huawei into Canada's 5G network due to security concerns raised by former intelligence officials, and the cultural/political dynamics of Chinese students in Canadian universities. The text concludes with an analysis of influence versus interference, noting that Canadian multiculturalism helps blunt specific political efforts by the CCP.

People (3)

Name Role Context
Richard Fadden Former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Advocated for banning Huawei from Canada's 5G network.
Ward Elcock Former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Advocated for banning Huawei from Canada's 5G network.
John Adams Former head of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
Advocated for banning Huawei from Canada's 5G network.

Organizations (8)

Name Type Context
Huawei
Chinese telecom giant debated in Canada regarding 5G networks; suspected links to PLA.
People's Liberation Army
China's military, suspected to have links with Huawei.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
Canadian intelligence agency.
Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
Canadian signal intelligence agency.
Globe and Mail
Newspaper that reported the views of Fadden, Elcock, and Adams.
United Front
Political entity/strategy whose goals are met by pro-PRC culture in university programs.
CCP (Chinese Communist Party)
Mentioned regarding political efforts within the Canadian Chinese community.
House Oversight Committee
Implied by the document footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.

Timeline (1 events)

August
Former intelligence heads tell Globe and Mail that Canada should ban Huawei.
Canada

Locations (5)

Location Context
Primary location of the report's subject matter.
Country of origin for Huawei and influence operations.
Mentioned as having little significant Huawei business.
Mentioned as having banned Huawei from 5G projects.
Location of a specific Canadian university discussed.

Relationships (2)

Richard Fadden Professional/Ideological Ward Elcock
Both former CSIS directors who jointly advocated for a Huawei ban.
Huawei Suspected Affiliation People's Liberation Army
Document states Huawei is 'widely believed to have links' with the PLA.

Key Quotes (3)

"Huawei, which is widely believed to have links with China’s People’s Liberation Army."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020613.jpg
Quote #1
"Canada should also ban Huawei from supplying equipment for a 5G network."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020613.jpg
Quote #2
"It appears that social isolation is the driving factor in this case."
Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020613.jpg
Quote #3

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,843 characters)

154
Business
One of the emerging debates in Canada concerns the future of China’s telecom giant, Huawei, which is widely believed to have links with China’s People’s Liberation Army. Huawei has little significant business in the United States and was recently banned from participating in Australia’s 5G wireless network project. Now Canada is debating that issue, despite the fact that the firm has established a vast network of relationships with all of Canada’s major telecom carriers and Canada’s leading research universities. Two former directors of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service—Richard Fadden and Ward Elcock—as well as John Adams, the former head of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), told the Globe and Mail in August that Canada should also ban Huawei from supplying equipment for a 5G network.14
Universities
An example from academia suggests the efficacy of Canadian efforts to combat China’s influence operations. At one West Coast Canadian university with large numbers of students from the PRC in undergraduate humanities and social science courses, where potentially divergent views of China and Chinese political behavior regularly form part of the curriculum, there has been no observation of the pressures documented in Australia, where professors are often openly criticized by Chinese students for proposing less flattering ways of looking at China. However, at that university’s for-profit “international transition program,” which offers international students who did not qualify for admission the chance (for a fee) to prepare to meet entrance requirements, university administrators have generally failed to integrate the students who are overwhelmingly PRC Chinese with poor English ability into the broader campus community. The result is that, even without PRC consular pressure, there is a strong pro-PRC culture of “political correctness” that conforms to United Front goals without the effort to promote it. It appears that social isolation is the driving factor in this case.
Conclusion
Much of China’s influence activities in Canada are a legitimate extension of the public diplomacy in which all nations engage. The pressing issue is when and where China crosses the line between influence and interference. Canadian experience so far suggests more influence work than interference. However, there are clear examples where such influence has become interference. So far, it would appear that the key variable for the relatively low impact of Chinese state efforts (or proxies) turns out to be Canadian practice more than Chinese state efforts. That is, the internal diversity of the Canadian Chinese community blunts political efforts by any one political party (including the CCP). More generally, Canadian practices of multiculturalism,
Appendix 2
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020613

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