This document appears to be a page from a report, book, or presentation discussing the 2003 Columbia Space Shuttle disaster as a case study in failure analysis and decision-making. It details the timeline of the foam strike, the internal debate among engineers and managers, and the fatal decision to reenter the atmosphere. The page contains a diagram of a Shuttle Tile and bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp, indicating it is part of a Congressional investigation evidence file.
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Seven astronauts | Victims |
Killed when the shuttle disintegrated on reentry.
|
| Engineers | Technical Staff |
Debated the damage on the ground; gave presentations to managers.
|
| NASA managers | Decision Makers |
Decided the shuttle was undamaged and the risk was minimal.
|
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| NASA | ||
| House Oversight Committee (implied by footer) |
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
"Bad Understanding Can Kill"Source
"During the launch a small piece of foam insulation broke off the fuel tank and hit the shuttlecraft."Source
"In the end, it was decided the risk was minimal and the shuttle could safely return to Earth."Source
"NASA managers had decided the shuttle was undamaged based on a series of presentations by the engineers."Source
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