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be, it is unclear that the newcomers would follow the Assads'
cautious-use doctrine and refusal to share chemical weapons with non-
state groups, or that the new leaders would be able to maintain strict
security measures at the chemical sites.
Meanwhile, it's possible that an existential threat will cause the Assad
regime to abandon its previous policy of restraint regarding chemical
weapons. It is not a huge leap from attacking civilians with tank fire,
machine guns, and naval artillery to deploying poison gas, and the
shock effect and sense of dread engendered by even limited use could
quash a city-wide uprising within an hour.
The options available to the United States to minimize these risks are
limited at best. Washington has certainly warned Assad against using
the weapons domestically. But with Assad already at risk of
indictment for crimes against humanity, and given his likely belief
that the United States will not intervene militarily due to its
commitments elsewhere -- including its politically unpopular and still
opaque involvement in Libya -- U.S. warnings may have little
deterrent effect.
A preemptive Israeli military strike to destroy the weapons does not
appear technically feasible: Even if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu were ready to change the status quo, Assad is believed to
have stored bulk chemical agents and filled (or quickly filled) shells
and bombs in underground bunkers at multiple sites throughout the
country. Moreover, even if Israel used incendiary bombs in an
attempt to incinerate the chemical agents, the risk of dispersing large
quantities of poisonous liquids would remain, with the potential to
cause large-scale casualties.
The Obama administration needs to start planning now to manage
Assad's chemical weapons legacy. If a new government replaces
Assad -- or even if different groups compete for international
recognition -- a U.S.-led coalition, including Turkey and the leading

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