DOJ-OGR-00003000.jpg
733 KB
Extraction Summary
6
People
4
Organizations
1
Locations
1
Events
0
Relationships
7
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
733 KB
Summary
This legal document, part of a court filing from April 16, 2021, argues against using a 'categorical approach' to interpret the phrase 'offense involving' in Section 3283. It cites several legal precedents, most notably Weingarten v. United States, to counter an argument made by an individual named Maxwell. The document asserts that Congress intended a broad application of the statute and that the categorical approach, typically used in sentencing or immigration contexts, is not appropriate here.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Schneider |
Mentioned as a party in the case citation 'Schneider, 801 F.3d at 197'.
|
|
| Dodge |
Mentioned as a party in the case citation 'United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347'.
|
|
| Weingarten |
Mentioned as a party in the case citation 'Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 n.10' and 'Weingarten v. United States'.
|
|
| Bridges |
Mentioned in a parenthetical distinguishing the 'Bridges' case.
|
|
| Vickers |
Mentioned as a party in the case citation 'Vickers, 2014 WL 1838255'.
|
|
| Maxwell |
Mentioned as the person whose argument is being rejected by the court, as in 'the argument Maxwell now asserts'.
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Congress | government agency |
Mentioned in relation to its legislative intent for the WSLA and Section 3283.
|
| Second Circuit | judicial body |
Referenced as the court that examined the issue in the Weingarten case.
|
| 11th Cir. | judicial body |
Mentioned in the citation for United States v. Dodge.
|
| DOJ-OGR | government agency |
Appears in the footer of the document (DOJ-OGR-00003000).
|
Timeline (1 events)
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Mentioned as a party in the case names 'United States v. Dodge' and 'Weingarten v. United States'.
|
Key Quotes (7)
"cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible."Source
— Schneider court (quoting United States v. Dodge)
(Describing the general intention of the law.)
DOJ-OGR-00003000.jpg
Quote #1
"essential ingredient"Source
— Bridges court
(Part of a test distinguished in the Weingarten case.)
DOJ-OGR-00003000.jpg
Quote #2
"effectuated Congress’s specific intent to limit the WSLA’s extended limitations period to only a few offenses,"Source
— Weingarten court (describing the Bridges case)
(Explaining the reasoning in the Bridges case.)
DOJ-OGR-00003000.jpg
Quote #3
"Congress had the opposite intention for Section 3283"Source
— Weingarten court
(Contrasting the intent for Section 3283 with that of the law in the Bridges case.)
DOJ-OGR-00003000.jpg
Quote #4
"[T]he defendant argues that the charged offense does not “involve” the sexual abuse of a child, as reflected in the elements of the offense."Source
— Vickers court
(Quoted as an example of a defendant's argument.)
DOJ-OGR-00003000.jpg
Quote #5
"daunting practical difficulties and potential unfairness"Source
— Weingarten court
(Describing obstacles that would be encountered if a court examined the facts of a prior conviction.)
DOJ-OGR-00003000.jpg
Quote #6
"[T]hat Congress used the word ‘involving’ in § 3283 does not necessarily mean it intended to trigger the categorical approach."Source
— Weingarten court
(The court's rejection of the argument that the word 'involving' requires a categorical approach.)
DOJ-OGR-00003000.jpg
Quote #7
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,161 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 66 of 239
rather, has evinced a general intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare
as many offenses against children as possible.”
as many offenses against children as possible.”
Schneider, 801 F.3d at 197 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010)
(en banc)); see Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 n.10 (distinguishing Bridges because the “essential
ingredient” test there “effectuated Congress’s specific intent to limit the WSLA’s extended
limitations period to only a few offenses,” while “Congress had the opposite intention for Section
3283”); see also Vickers, 2014 WL 1838255, at *11-12 (“[T]he defendant argues that the charged
offense does not “involve” the sexual abuse of a child, as reflected in the elements of the offense.
Defendant’s argument is illogical and clearly misinterprets the use of the term ‘involving’ in
section 3283.”).
(en banc)); see Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 n.10 (distinguishing Bridges because the “essential
ingredient” test there “effectuated Congress’s specific intent to limit the WSLA’s extended
limitations period to only a few offenses,” while “Congress had the opposite intention for Section
3283”); see also Vickers, 2014 WL 1838255, at *11-12 (“[T]he defendant argues that the charged
offense does not “involve” the sexual abuse of a child, as reflected in the elements of the offense.
Defendant’s argument is illogical and clearly misinterprets the use of the term ‘involving’ in
section 3283.”).
Although the Second Circuit has not yet reached this issue, it examined this question in
Weingarten v. United States, in the context of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. Rejecting the claim, the Second Circuit observed that none of the
criteria for applying the categorical approach are met in the context of Section 3283. Id. The
categorical approach—which focuses on the elements of the offense—is generally only used in
settings like sentencing and immigration, where a court is asked to evaluate the conduct from a
prior conviction. Id. at 59. In such a context, a court attempting to examine the facts of the prior
conviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequences would encounter
logistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and “daunting practical
difficulties and potential unfairness”). None of those concerns is present here, where the relevant
facts will be proved at trial.
Weingarten v. United States, in the context of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. Rejecting the claim, the Second Circuit observed that none of the
criteria for applying the categorical approach are met in the context of Section 3283. Id. The
categorical approach—which focuses on the elements of the offense—is generally only used in
settings like sentencing and immigration, where a court is asked to evaluate the conduct from a
prior conviction. Id. at 59. In such a context, a court attempting to examine the facts of the prior
conviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequences would encounter
logistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and “daunting practical
difficulties and potential unfairness”). None of those concerns is present here, where the relevant
facts will be proved at trial.
The Weingarten court also specifically rejected the argument Maxwell now asserts: that
the words “offense involving” require a categorical approach. “[T]hat Congress used the word
‘involving’ in § 3283 does not necessarily mean it intended to trigger the categorical approach.
the words “offense involving” require a categorical approach. “[T]hat Congress used the word
‘involving’ in § 3283 does not necessarily mean it intended to trigger the categorical approach.
39
DOJ-OGR-00003000
Discussion 0
No comments yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this epstein document