HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023508.jpg

22

can be achieved only through “jihad and resistance until the Islamic
regime rises.”
The chaos and disappointment that follow revolutions will inevitably
provide many opportunities for Al Qaeda to spread its influence.
Demographic pressures, economic woes and corruption will continue
to bedevil even the best-run governments in the region. Divisions will
beset the protest movements, and vestiges of the old regimes may re-
emerge.
Al Qaeda and its allies don’t need to win the allegiance of every
protester to exert their influence; they have a patient view of history.
Although Washington must avoid tainting organic movements or
being perceived as a central protagonist, the United States and its
Western allies should not be shy about working with reformers and
democrats to shape the region’s trajectory — and ensuring Al
Qaeda’s irrelevance in the Sunni Arab world, the heart of its
supposed constituency.
In countries where autocrats have been toppled (as in Egypt and
Tunisia), we must help shape the new political and social
environment; in nondemocratic, allied states (like the region’s
monarchies), we need to accelerate internal reform; and in repressive
states (like Iran, Libya and Syria), we should challenge the legitimacy
of autocratic regimes and openly assist dissidents and democrats.
This is not about military intervention or the imposition of American-
style democracy. It is about using American power and influence to
support organic reform movements.
The United States Agency for International Development and
advocacy organizations can help civil society groups grow; human
rights groups can organize and assist networks of dissidents; and
Western women’s groups and trade unions could support their
counterparts throughout the Middle East. Wealthy philanthropists
and entrepreneurs who are part of the Middle Eastern diaspora could

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023508