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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 65 Filed 10/20/20 Page 3 of 4

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Third, the defense’s claim that the Materials are “material to preparing [her] defense” under
Rule 16, and thus subject to immediate disclosure, is premised on a reimagining of the charges
against the defendant. (Def. Ltr. 1, 4). An item is “material to preparing the defense” under Rule
16 only insofar as “it could be used to counter the government’s case or bolster a defense.” United
States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993). Thus, materials that are wholly irrelevant
to the Government’s case or the charges in the Indictment do not fall under Rule 16. That is the
case here. Contrary to the defense’s claim, the Government has not charged Maxwell with being
Jeffrey Epstein’s “madam” and “principal facilitator of his abuse.” (Def. Ltr. 3). Instead, the
defendant is charged with helping Epstein identify, groom, and sexually abuse multiple minor
victims between 1994 and 1997. The Indictment does not allege that the defendant engaged in
such conduct after 1997. As such, the Materials are simply not relevant to the charges in the
Indictment, much less exculpatory to the defendant.

Maxwell’s argument is equally flawed with respect to the perjury counts. (Def. Ltr. 3).
The Indictment alleges that the Government’s evidence on Counts One through Four based on her
conduct from 1994 to 1997 is also evidence of the falsity of the answers provided in the deposition.
Specifically, the portions of her deposition that the Government alleges in the Indictment are false
are all contradicted by the allegations contained in paragraphs one through seven of the Indictment,
which focus exclusively on the period 1994 through 1997. Indeed, paragraph eight of the
Indictment notes that the defendant’s statements during her deposition contradicted “some of the
specific events and acts of abuse detailed” in paragraphs one through seven of the Indictment,
which focus exclusively on the period from 1994 through 1997. (Indictment, Docket No. 17, at
10). Consistent with that position, Counts Five and Six both incorporate by reference paragraphs
one through eight of the Indictment. (See id. at 15-16). Accordingly, evidence that the defendant
did or did not participate in Epstein’s abuse of minor victims at different times or on different
occasions not charged in the Indictment would not undercut the Government’s theory or exculpate
the defendant on those counts.

Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the Government is not suggesting that these
Materials should be kept from the defense indefinitely. Rather, the Government requests
authorization to provide these Materials eight weeks prior to trial, along with its production of
statements of other non-testifying witnesses. Even assuming arguendo that the Materials
constitute Brady or Rule 16 evidence—which they do not for all of the reasons discussed above—
the defendant cites no case law for the proposition that she is entitled to their production now,
rather than eight weeks in advance of trial. The Second Circuit has held that “as a general rule,
Brady and its progeny do not require immediate disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment
material upon request by a defendant.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2001).
Instead, “the Government ‘suppresses’ evidence within the meaning of Brady only if it fails to
disclose Brady and Giglio material in time for its effective use at trial or at a plea proceeding.” Id.
What constitutes sufficient time for “effective use at trial” depends on the “materiality of that
evidence” and “the particular circumstances of the case.” Id.

Here, the defendant has made no showing as to why eight weeks in advance of trial would
not be enough time to make “effective use” of the Materials at trial or how she would otherwise
be prejudiced by the Government’s proposed disclosure timeline. Coppa, 267 F.3d at 146. Indeed,
given that the Materials constitute approximately 40 pages of records and approximately 40

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