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talks. I did realize that, “null and void” or not, our proposals or suggestions would
not simply disappear from memory. But I felt the point of principle was essential if
Israel was going to be able to consider the kind of far-reaching concessions which
final peace deals might require.

In the end, I realized that we might simply discover that Assad, and certainly
Arafat, were not willing or ready to make peace. We might, initially at least, have
to settle for a more incremental step. “Right here in Camp David, Begin, Sadat and
Carter couldn’t complete the process,” I pointed out. “They signed a ‘framework
agreement’ and it took months of further diplomacy to reach a peace treaty. Maybe
we’ll end up doing the same.” But I told the President I was convinced that if we
didn’t try to get agreements, we’d have no way of knowing whether the will to
make peace was there on the other side. Assad, I suspected, was the more likely to
reciprocate. That was a major reason I wanted to start our efforts with him. But so
far, his true intentions had never been tested, beyond his obvious determination to
get back the Golan. Nor had Arafat’s, beyond his focus on the detail and extent of
West Bank redeployments.

President Clinton did not object to an early effort to reopen our efforts with the
Syrians. But he was worried about the effects of ignoring the already-creaking
prospects of fulfilling the promise of Oslo. If we were going to delay focusing on
that, Clinton told me, he needed to be able to assure Arafat the wait would be
worth his while. What could we give the PLO leader in return for putting off the
Wye redeployments further, he asked. And then, the real question on his mind:
“Ehud, when we get to the final redeployment and a peace deal, how much of the
West Bank are you prepared to hand back?”

I simply didn’t know at this stage. Much would depend on whether we could be
sure Arafat could or would deliver a final peace. But even if I had known, I would
have been reluctant to name a precise percentage. Though I had full trust in
President Clinton, I knew that everything he and I said would be shared with at
least a few of his closest policy aides and negotiators. Sooner or later, word would
get to Arafat. When we did begin negotiations, he’d take whatever number I gave
as a mere starting point. Still, I knew I had to signal the President that I was serious
about negotiating with Arafat when the time came. I also knew the main source of
his concern. In order to get the agreement at Wye, the President had signed on to a
provision that the dimension of the third and final redeployment phase would be
determined by Israel alone. By that stage, when we got there, Arafat would have

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