HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028275.jpg
Extraction Summary
6
People
5
Organizations
3
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / memoir page (evidence production)
File Size:
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a memoir by Ehud Barak (marked with a House Oversight stamp), detailing the strategic considerations in 2012 regarding a potential Israeli military strike on Iran. The text describes the operational readiness, political opposition within Israel, and the eventual decision by Barak to call off the strike due to the presence of US troops for joint exercises and the potential damage to US-Israel relations. It draws parallels to Menachem Begin's 1981 decision to bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ehud Barak | Narrator / Author (Implied by header 'BARAK' and context) |
Discussing military decisions regarding Iran and conversations with Obama.
|
| Barack Obama | President of the United States |
Recipient of communication from the narrator regarding the decision-making process.
|
| Benjamin Netanyahu | Prime Minister of Israel (referred to as 'Bibi') |
Decision maker alongside the narrator regarding the attack on Iran.
|
| Menachem Begin | Former Prime Minister of Israel |
Historical reference regarding the 1981 bombing of Saddam Hussein's reactor.
|
| Saddam Hussein | Former President of Iraq |
Mentioned in context of the 1981 nuclear reactor bombing.
|
| Shimon Peres | Former Head of Labor Opposition |
Historical reference; opposed the 1981 strike.
|
Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Mossad |
Mentioned in historical context regarding the 1981 strike.
|
|
| Israeli Military Intelligence |
Mentioned in historical context.
|
|
| Nuclear Energy Commission |
Mentioned in historical context.
|
|
| Labor Party |
Mentioned in historical context regarding Shimon Peres.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Source of the document production (stamp).
|
Timeline (3 events)
1981
Summer 2012
Planned timeframe for Israeli attack on Iran, delayed due to tensions and joint exercises.
Iran / Israel
Israel Defense Forces
US Military
Relationships (2)
Narrator states the decision rested with 'Bibi and me'.
Narrator recounts telling President Obama about the decision-making process.
Key Quotes (3)
"the logical time for us to attack was the summer of 2012"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028275.jpg
Quote #1
"the decision in effect rested with Bibi and me"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028275.jpg
Quote #2
"I finally decided against an Israeli strike – not because I doubted the damage it would do to Iran’s nuclear efforts, but because of the damage it would surely do to our ties with the"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028275.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,339 characters)
/ BARAK / 141
was important to convey to him honestly, face-to-face, where Israel stood on Iran.
Or at least where I stood.
Or at least where I stood.
* * *
With our joint exercises pushed back until the fall, the logical time for us to
attack was the summer of 2012, when the atmospheric and weather conditions
were optimal. Operationally, everything was ready. Politically, those ministers who
were against military action had not changed their minds. If anything, they seemed
more strongly opposed. Ironically, they now argued that because we’d waited so
long, the Iranians were too close to their “window of immunity.” Even some senior
members of the military and security establishment, though in agreement over the
technical aspects of the attack plan, retained political reservations. But as I’d told
President Obama, now that we had the operational support of the military and
intelligence professionals, the decision in effect rested with Bibi and me. The fact
we were ready to go ahead in those circumstances was not unprecedented. When
Menachem Begin ordered the bombing of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor in
1981, he had acted against the advice of the then-heads of both the Mossad and
military intelligence, the chairman of our nuclear energy commission, and of
Shimon Peres, who was head of the Labor opposition.
attack was the summer of 2012, when the atmospheric and weather conditions
were optimal. Operationally, everything was ready. Politically, those ministers who
were against military action had not changed their minds. If anything, they seemed
more strongly opposed. Ironically, they now argued that because we’d waited so
long, the Iranians were too close to their “window of immunity.” Even some senior
members of the military and security establishment, though in agreement over the
technical aspects of the attack plan, retained political reservations. But as I’d told
President Obama, now that we had the operational support of the military and
intelligence professionals, the decision in effect rested with Bibi and me. The fact
we were ready to go ahead in those circumstances was not unprecedented. When
Menachem Begin ordered the bombing of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor in
1981, he had acted against the advice of the then-heads of both the Mossad and
military intelligence, the chairman of our nuclear energy commission, and of
Shimon Peres, who was head of the Labor opposition.
But as we neared our final, formal decision, we were forced into another delay.
In the summer of 2012, an unrelated flare-up of tensions in the Gulf caused Iran
and several of its neighbors to place their forces on heightened alert. Though the
peak-alert phase passed quickly, Iran’s military was still not back on a fully normal
footing by the start of September, and when small American advance teams began
arriving for the joint exercises, Iran’s alert level went up again. Technically, we
could still have gone ahead with the attack. In all probability, it would still have
succeeded, setting back the Iranians’ program by at least a year and, depending on
how quickly they could rebuild and resupply clandestinely abroad, perhaps for
significantly longer.
In the summer of 2012, an unrelated flare-up of tensions in the Gulf caused Iran
and several of its neighbors to place their forces on heightened alert. Though the
peak-alert phase passed quickly, Iran’s military was still not back on a fully normal
footing by the start of September, and when small American advance teams began
arriving for the joint exercises, Iran’s alert level went up again. Technically, we
could still have gone ahead with the attack. In all probability, it would still have
succeeded, setting back the Iranians’ program by at least a year and, depending on
how quickly they could rebuild and resupply clandestinely abroad, perhaps for
significantly longer.
But as more and more American soldiers and sailors arrived, I finally decided
against an Israeli strike – not because I doubted the damage it would do to Iran’s
nuclear efforts, but because of the damage it would surely do to our ties with the
against an Israeli strike – not because I doubted the damage it would do to Iran’s
nuclear efforts, but because of the damage it would surely do to our ties with the
427
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028275
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028275
Discussion 0
No comments yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this epstein document