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both the self-perspective and the other-perspective were associated with activation in the neural network involved in pain processing. These results reveal the similarities in neural networks representing first- and third-person information. In addition, however, the self-perspective yielded higher pain ratings and involved more extensive activation of some circuits in the pain matrix than did the other-perspective, thus highlighting important differences between self- and other-perspectives.

Neuroanatomical regions and circuits form the foundation for the experience of pain in others, but they are not sufficient to explain variability in interpersonal sensitivity. Although empathetic brain circuits are activated by the mere perception of pain in others, activity in these circuits can be modulated by social, motivational, and cognitive factors. For example, observing pain in likable others (i.e., those who played a game fairly) resulted in an enhancement of empathic brain responses, whereas pain in dislikable others who played unfairly did not. Another functional MRI study (10) found that participants showed significantly greater responses in neural regions that are involved in pain perception when observing the pain of people who were not responsible for their stigmatized condition (i.e., individuals who contracted AIDS as the result of a blood transfusion) than either controls (healthy individuals) or people who were held responsible for their condition (i.e., those who contracted AIDS through illegal drug use). In addition, participants expressed more empathy and personal distress in response to the pain of people who were not responsible for their stigmatized condition as compared to controls. The

level of empathic response, therefore, seems to be influenced by motivational factors as well as the interpersonal relationship between the target and the observer.

Altogether, these findings demonstrate that the similarities between affective representations of the self and the other stem from shared neural circuits that can be emulated either automatically or intentionally by the act of perspective-taking. Importantly, these findings also point to some distinctions between these two representations, distinctions that contribute to our capacity to detach ourselves from others sufficiently to make considered responses to their pain.

Conclusion

Empathy, the natural capacity to share, appreciate, and respond to the affective states of others, plays a crucial role in much of human social interaction from birth to the end of life. As would be expected if empathy functions to enhance social cohesion, social non-human primate species also exhibit rudimentary versions of empathy. What humans have in abundance are higher-level cognitive and social abilities (language, theory of mind, executive functions) that can be deployed to modulate empathic responses, and that are amenable to modulation by lower-level processes such as emotional contagion and mimicry. These levels of processing enable empathy to have an impact on a wide variety of human behaviors. From motivating prosocial behavior to providing the affective and motivational bases for moral development, empathy is an invisible force to reckon with when considering how humans behave toward each other.

References

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