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compromises that we might have to contemplate during peace negotiations were still anathema to many other Israelis.

* * *

Syria was always my first negotiating priority, as it had been for Rabin and, for a brief period, Bibi as well. This was not just because the shape of a final agreement with the Syrians was clearer, to both sides, than with the Palestinians. It was because I was determined to make good on the main specific policy pledge of my campaign: to bring our troops home from Lebanon. No matter what the increasingly emboldened fighters of Hizbollah said publicly, our withdrawal would be bad news for them. It would deprive them of their “anti-occupation” rationale for firing Katyushas into towns and settlements in northern Israel, and free us politically to strike back hard if that proved necessary. It was clear to me that Hizbollah would try to make the withdrawal as difficult for us as possible. But the real power in Lebanon rested with the Syrians, who, along with Iran, were Hizbollah’s main backers. If we could get a peace agreement with Assad, there seemed every reason to hope he would rein in Hizbollah, and perhaps open the way to a peace treaty with Lebanon as well.

Still, there was no way of hiding an additional attraction in getting a deal with Syria first: it would increase our negotiating leverage with the Palestinians. That would certainly not be lost on Yasir Arafat – one reason that I realized the importance of an early meeting with him, to convey my commitment to keeping the Oslo process alive, and, if possible, achieving a full and final Israeli-Palestinian peace.

* * *

I went to see Arafat a few days after taking office. We met for well over an hour at Erez, the main crossing point into Gaza. It was swelteringly hot inside. At least I was in an ordinary business suit, but I couldn’t help wondering how Arafat

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