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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi

xl The Crooked Course

conflicts. These heroic attempts, facilitated by President Bill Clinton and his team, created a crisis of expectations, leading to the second Intifada and violent confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians, with tragic loss of life on both sides. This illustrates a fundamental dilemma in the choice between a gradualist and a totalist approach. Totalism’s “all or nothing” approach is inherently risky. When it backfires, it easily leads to a relapse into violence. Gradualism is less spectacular and appealing, with its incremental and long-term approach. However, it is precisely these characteristics which make it less risky, and more successful under some circumstances.

While totalism failed in 2000, with tragic consequences, it nevertheless broke down a number of taboos, such as addressing explicitly the partition of Jerusalem and the issue of Palestinian refugees.

ON PART V: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN DOMESTIC DOCUMENTS

Part V seeks to provide a fuller context to the quest for peace in the Middle East. All politics are local, and the Arab–Israeli conflict typifies this axiom. The ability of negotiators to come to conclusions is only half the story. Documents such as the original Palestinian National Charter or Israel’s Declaration of Independence shaped attitudes, policies, and action on both sides.

Furthermore, the Part includes important policy statements that signal revisions of previous policies such as Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s vision for a new Palestinian state. In August 2009, Fayyad introduced the “Program of the Thirteenth Government” (the Fayyad Plan), which established a path to develop a functional Palestinian state within a two-year time frame. The blueprint sought to establish and improve governing institutions, end Palestinian economic dependence on Israel, and enhance overall infrastructure. It was a move to create a de facto Palestinian state within the existing Palestinian territory, regardless of any formal recognition of such an entity. Fayyad sought proactive steps to “end the occupation, despite the occupation”. He stressed it was not meant as a unilateral declaration of statehood.

Indeed, substantial developments did take place during Prime Minister Fayyad’s tenure. In 2011, both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund made statements that the Palestinian Authority was capable of running the economy of an independent state, and that it was on track to developing the necessary functions of a state.

The Middle East peace process continues to run its crooked course. There is no quick fix. Yet, as this volume demonstrates, many brave attempts have been made to bring peace to this troubled region.

By compiling annotated documents related to the quest for peace in the Middle East, a useful record and reference tool are created. Our hope is also that this volume will inspire future students, analysts, policy makers, and negotiators to learn from, and draw on, the experiences of the past.

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