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733 KB

Extraction Summary

5
People
2
Organizations
1
Locations
2
Events
0
Relationships
6
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Legal document
File Size: 733 KB
Summary

This legal document, a page from a court filing, discusses the legal standard for materiality in a perjury case. It cites several precedents (Gaudin, Kross, Birrell, Chan Lo) to define what constitutes a material false statement, particularly in the context of a deposition. The document concludes by arguing that the defendant's deposition statements were knowingly false and that the determination of their truthfulness is a matter for the jury at trial, not for a pretrial dismissal.

People (5)

Name Role Context
Gaudin Defendant
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995).
Kross Defendant
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994).
Birrell Defendant
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972).
Chan Lo Defendant
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Chan Lo, No. 14 Cr. 491 (VSB), 2016 WL 9076234.
Forde
Mentioned in the case citation Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 412.

Organizations (2)

Name Type Context
United States government agency
Appears as the plaintiff in multiple case citations (e.g., United States v. Gaudin).
Triumph Capital Group, Inc. company
Mentioned as the defendant in the case citation United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc.

Timeline (2 events)

2016-02-04
A decision was made in the case of United States v. Chan Lo.
S.D.N.Y.
2021-04-16
Document 204 was filed in case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE.

Locations (1)

Location Context
Mentioned as the court district in the citation for United States v. Chan Lo (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016).

Key Quotes (6)

"a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed."
Source
— United States v. Gaudin (Defining a material false statement in a perjury case.)
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Quote #1
"a truthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit."
Source
— United States v. Kross (Defining a material statement made in a civil deposition.)
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Quote #2
"it must be shown that a truthful answer would have been of sufficient probative importance to the inquiry so that, as a minimum, further fruitful investigation would have occurred."
Source
— United States v. Birrell (Explaining the standard for materiality in the context of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.)
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Quote #3
"The testimony need not have actually influenced, misled, or impeded the proceeding."
Source
— United States v. Chan Lo (Clarifying that the actual effect of the testimony is not required for it to be material.)
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Quote #4
"except in the most extraordinary circumstances."
Source
— Forde (Stating that the question of materiality is for the jury, with a very narrow exception.)
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Quote #5
"Generally, the meaning and truthfulness of a defendant’s statement is a question of fact for the"
Source
— United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc. (Arguing that the defendant's deposition statements should be evaluated by a jury.)
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Quote #6

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,190 characters)

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 149 of 239
Finally, even if a defendant makes a knowing false statement, a perjury conviction requires that the statement be material. A false statement is material if it has “a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if “a truthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit.” United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel, that “it must be shown that a truthful answer would have been of sufficient probative importance to the inquiry so that, as a minimum, further fruitful investigation would have occurred.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “The testimony need not have actually influenced, misled, or impeded the proceeding.” United States v. Chan Lo, No. 14 Cr. 491 (VSB), 2016 WL 9076234, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016), aff’d 679 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2017); see Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 412. Since materiality is an element of the offense, it is a question for the jury “except in the most extraordinary circumstances.” Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 412 (citing Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522–23).
C. Discussion
The Government expects to prove at trial that the defendant’s deposition statements were knowingly false. The defendant’s strained efforts to inject ambiguity into the questioning and to justify her answers as truthful are in significant part, arguments that are properly put to the jury and not a basis to dismiss the counts pretrial and without the benefit of a complete record. See United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 237 F. App’x 625, 627–28 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Generally, the meaning and truthfulness of a defendant’s statement is a question of fact for the
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