DOJ-OGR-00000206.tif
35.3 KB
Extraction Summary
4
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
0
Events
1
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document (likely a brief or court filing)
File Size:
35.3 KB
Summary
This document discusses the unequal bargaining power between the government and defendants in plea agreements, citing legal precedents and academic works. It highlights that ambiguities in such agreements should be construed against the government and emphasizes the significant power held by the United States Attorney in the legal process, making plea bargains akin to contracts of adhesion where the defendant has little choice but to accept the offer.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Charles Breyer | Judge |
accurately described the process of plea bargaining
|
| Erik Luna | Author |
co-author of 'Prosecutors as Judges'
|
| Marianne Wade | Author |
co-author of 'Prosecutors as Judges'
|
| defendant | Litigant |
referred to generally in the context of plea agreements and bargaining power
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States Government |
referred to as having 'advantage in bargaining power' and offering plea deals
|
|
| United States Attorney |
possesses 'enormous power' in the legal process
|
|
| DOJ-OGR |
Document identification mark (Department of Justice - Office of Government Relations, or similar)
|
Relationships (1)
co-authored 'Prosecutors as Judges'
Key Quotes (4)
""advantage in bargaining power""Source
DOJ-OGR-00000206.tif
Quote #1
"ambiguities like this one must be construed against the government."Source
DOJ-OGR-00000206.tif
Quote #2
"It is no answer to say that [the defendant] is striking a deal with the Government, and could reject this term if he wanted to, because that statement does not reflect the reality of the bargaining table."Source
DOJ-OGR-00000206.tif
Quote #3
""American prosecutors . . . choose whether to engage in plea negotiations and the terms of an acceptable agreement.""Source
DOJ-OGR-00000206.tif
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,496 characters)
6
defendant. Even the most ably represented defendant
cannot overcome this unequal balance of power. The
government's substantial "advantage in bargaining
power" means that ambiguities like this one must be
construed against the government. United States v.
Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d Cir. 2002).
Defense counsel confront their clients' unequal
bargaining power every time they attempt to obtain
a resolution that is in the best interest of their client
while mollifying a prosecutor who has little institutional
incentive to be lenient. Judge Charles Breyer accurately
described the process:
It is no answer to say that [the defendant] is
striking a deal with the Government, and could
reject this term if he wanted to, because that
statement does not reflect the reality of the
bargaining table. See Erik Luna & Marianne
Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1413, 1414–15 (2010). As to terms such
as this one, plea agreements are contracts of
adhesion. The Government offers the defendant
a deal, and the defendant can take it or leave it.
Id. ("American prosecutors . . . choose whether
to engage in plea negotiations and the terms
of an acceptable agreement."). If he leaves it,
he does so at his peril. And the peril is real,
because on the other side of the offer is the
enormous power of the United States Attorney
to investigate, to order arrests, to bring a case
or to dismiss it, to recommend a sentence or
the conditions of supervised release, and on
DOJ-OGR-00000206
defendant. Even the most ably represented defendant
cannot overcome this unequal balance of power. The
government's substantial "advantage in bargaining
power" means that ambiguities like this one must be
construed against the government. United States v.
Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d Cir. 2002).
Defense counsel confront their clients' unequal
bargaining power every time they attempt to obtain
a resolution that is in the best interest of their client
while mollifying a prosecutor who has little institutional
incentive to be lenient. Judge Charles Breyer accurately
described the process:
It is no answer to say that [the defendant] is
striking a deal with the Government, and could
reject this term if he wanted to, because that
statement does not reflect the reality of the
bargaining table. See Erik Luna & Marianne
Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1413, 1414–15 (2010). As to terms such
as this one, plea agreements are contracts of
adhesion. The Government offers the defendant
a deal, and the defendant can take it or leave it.
Id. ("American prosecutors . . . choose whether
to engage in plea negotiations and the terms
of an acceptable agreement."). If he leaves it,
he does so at his peril. And the peril is real,
because on the other side of the offer is the
enormous power of the United States Attorney
to investigate, to order arrests, to bring a case
or to dismiss it, to recommend a sentence or
the conditions of supervised release, and on
DOJ-OGR-00000206
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