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647 KB
Extraction Summary
4
People
4
Organizations
3
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal filing / court memorandum
File Size:
647 KB
Summary
This document is page 9 (filed as page 3 of 15 in a specific docket) of a legal memorandum in the Ghislaine Maxwell case (Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN). The defense argues that contrary to government claims, Maxwell could be extradited from France because international treaties supersede national legislation, and that she would likely face extradition and be denied bail if she fled to the UK, supported by expert opinions from Mr. Julié and David Perry. The text refutes the relevance of a 2006 French non-extradition case and asserts that Maxwell's waiver of extradition would be a significant factor in foreign courts.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ghislaine Maxwell | Defendant |
Subject of the extradition and bail arguments; citizen of US, France, and potentially UK based on context.
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| Mr. Julié | Legal Expert (French Law) |
Provided a rebuttal report regarding French extradition laws and the French Constitution.
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| David Perry | Legal Expert (UK Extradition) |
Ms. Maxwell's expert opining on the likelihood of extradition from the UK and denial of bail.
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| Secretary of State | Government Official |
Mentioned in footnote regarding discretion to deny extradition orders.
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Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| MOJ (Ministry of Justice) |
Likely French Ministry of Justice, referenced regarding a letter about extradition provisions.
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| United States Government |
Referenced as 'The government', opposing the defense's arguments.
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| French Courts |
Judicial body in France.
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| U.S. Court |
Judicial body setting bail conditions.
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Timeline (2 events)
2006
Case where France refused to extradite a French national who was also a U.S. citizen.
France
French Courts
US Government
Locations (3)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Country of potential refuge/extradition discussion.
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Country seeking prosecution/extradition.
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Country of potential refuge/extradition discussion.
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Relationships (2)
Referenced as 'Mr. Julié’s accompanying rebuttal report' in support of Maxwell.
Referenced as 'Ms. Maxwell’s U.K. extradition expert, David Perry.'
Key Quotes (4)
"extradition of a French national to the United States is legally permissible if the extradition treaty between the United States and France provides for it—which it does."Source
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Quote #1
"it is 'highly unlikely' that an extradition decree would not be issued."Source
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Quote #2
"bail would be 'extremely unlikely.'"Source
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Quote #3
"the waiver would be 'a highly relevant factor' in the U.K. proceeding"Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,384 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 103-2 Filed 12/28/20 Page 3 of 15
as Mr. Julié’s accompanying rebuttal report explains (see Ex. A), the MOJ letter ignores that the
extradition provisions in French Code of Criminal Procedure apply only in the absence of an
international agreement providing otherwise. (Id. at 1). This rule is necessitated by the French
Constitution, which requires that international agreements prevail over national legislation. (Id.).
Thus, extradition of a French national to the United States is legally permissible if the extradition
treaty between the United States and France provides for it—which it does. (Id. at 3).
extradition provisions in French Code of Criminal Procedure apply only in the absence of an
international agreement providing otherwise. (Id. at 1). This rule is necessitated by the French
Constitution, which requires that international agreements prevail over national legislation. (Id.).
Thus, extradition of a French national to the United States is legally permissible if the extradition
treaty between the United States and France provides for it—which it does. (Id. at 3).
The government’s reliance on a 2006 case—in which France refused to extradite a
French national who was also a U.S. citizen—provides no precedent as to how a French court
would rule on an extradition request regarding Ms. Maxwell because, as Mr. Julié notes, the
United States did not challenge the refusal in the French courts. (Id. at 2-3). Nor does it
undermine Mr. Julié’s opinion that, in the unusual circumstance where a citizen of both countries
has executed an extradition waiver and then fled to France in violation of bail conditions set by a
U.S. court, it is “highly unlikely” that an extradition decree would not be issued. (Id. at 3).
French national who was also a U.S. citizen—provides no precedent as to how a French court
would rule on an extradition request regarding Ms. Maxwell because, as Mr. Julié notes, the
United States did not challenge the refusal in the French courts. (Id. at 2-3). Nor does it
undermine Mr. Julié’s opinion that, in the unusual circumstance where a citizen of both countries
has executed an extradition waiver and then fled to France in violation of bail conditions set by a
U.S. court, it is “highly unlikely” that an extradition decree would not be issued. (Id. at 3).
The government offers no rebuttal to the opinion of Ms. Maxwell’s U.K. extradition
expert, David Perry. Nor does it dispute Mr. Perry’s opinion that Ms. Maxwell would be “highly
unlikely” to successfully resist extradition from the United Kingdom, that her waiver would be
admissible in any extradition proceeding, and that—contrary to the government’s representation
at the initial bail hearing (Tr. 27)—bail would be “extremely unlikely.” (See Def. Mem. Ex. U at
¶ 39). Mr. Perry’s addendum opinion (attached as Ex. B) reiterates these points, opining that the
waiver would be “a highly relevant factor” in the U.K. proceeding, both to the likelihood of
extradition and to the likelihood of bail while the proceeding is pending. (Id. ¶ 3).⁷
expert, David Perry. Nor does it dispute Mr. Perry’s opinion that Ms. Maxwell would be “highly
unlikely” to successfully resist extradition from the United Kingdom, that her waiver would be
admissible in any extradition proceeding, and that—contrary to the government’s representation
at the initial bail hearing (Tr. 27)—bail would be “extremely unlikely.” (See Def. Mem. Ex. U at
¶ 39). Mr. Perry’s addendum opinion (attached as Ex. B) reiterates these points, opining that the
waiver would be “a highly relevant factor” in the U.K. proceeding, both to the likelihood of
extradition and to the likelihood of bail while the proceeding is pending. (Id. ¶ 3).⁷
⁷ Nor, as the government suggests, does the Secretary of State have general “discretion to deny extradition” after a
court has entered a final extradition order. (See Gov. Mem. at 19). That discretion is limited to a handful of
exceptional circumstances that would likely be inapplicable to Ms. Maxwell’s case. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5).
court has entered a final extradition order. (See Gov. Mem. at 19). That discretion is limited to a handful of
exceptional circumstances that would likely be inapplicable to Ms. Maxwell’s case. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5).
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