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adversary services, which also had the home court advantage, from stepping in. He also gave
adversaries an ample, if not wholly irresistible reason, to enter the game by saying that he had
access to NSA’s sources in China.
How could they resist such a prize?

As confidant as Snowden may have been that he was in control, the CIA believed that
confidence was misinformed. CIA Deputy Director Morell said, after reviewing the case on a
panel appointed by President Obama: “Snowden thinks he is smart, but he was never in a position
in his previous jobs to fully understand the immense capabilities of our Russian and Chinese
counterparts.” He could adopt a self-confident tone in his post-mortem conversations with
journalists in Moscow, but he had no means to block the efforts of the Chinese or Russian
services in Hong Kong. These intelligence services had no restrictions on their actions. For
example, the Chinese intelligence service could have spotted him on his arrival in Hong Kong
simply by cross- checking its aforementioned database of US intelligence workers who had
applied for a renewed security clearance in the past three years. It could have pinpointed his
whereabouts through its informant network in the Hong Kong Police and the security staffs of
hotels. Snowden’s mysterious “carer” would not be immune from detection by that network.
Russia, China’s longtime intelligence ally, would not even need to go to such lengths since, as
Putin gloatingly confirmed, he contacted its diplomats in Hong Kong. The Russian intelligence
service would them swing into action while Russian “diplomats” entered into talks with him. The
Russians would also glean from Snowden’s request for asylum that Hong Kong was only a
temporary stopover for him,

“The purpose of my [Hong Kong} mission was to get the information to journalists,” he
would tell the Guardian after he was safely ensconced in Moscow. After that brief mission, he
was “done” in Hong Kong. Where he planned to go next, mainland China was only a taxi ride
away and there was a direct flight to Moscow.

Snowden does not say how many days he planned to be in Hong Kong, but he indicated that
he was working under a tight clock. The time pressure resulted in him emailing Gellman at the
Washington Post an ultimatum on May 24, 2013: either Gellman publish the selected documents
in the Washington Post within 72 hours or he would lose the exclusive scoop. He wanted the
story to break on May 27, 2013 without his true identity (which Gellman did not know). Hid
identity would be known to a foreign mission in Hong Kong if Gellman acceded to his demands.
Since as previously mentioned, Gellman’s story would enclose an encoded signal he planned to
use as proof of his bona fides. So even before the Guardian reporters had agreed to come to
Hong Kong, he had plans to deal with a foreign mission. But he planned to keep his name out of
it. Instead, he insisted Gellman include in it a coded signal in it. When the Washington Post
turned down his ultimatum, he needed a different plan.

Time was running out if he was to break the story and leave Hong Kong before the NSA
realized he was missing. At best, he was safe until June 3rd. That was when he was supposed to
return from his two-week medical leave for getting treatment for epilepsy. But if he failed to show
up in Hawaii on June 3rd, alarm bells at the NSA would go off. It would not take long to find him.
Airline record would show that he had flown to Hong Kong. The NSA security staff would ask
questions, as Snowden explained from Moscow: “This guy isn’t where he says he’s supposed to
be. He’s supposed to be getting medical treatment. Why the hell is he in Hong Kong?” It would
then determine he had lied about his medical treatment, and it would immediate go after him with
the full power of the U.S. government.

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