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2.44 MB
Extraction Summary
6
People
0
Organizations
4
Locations
8
Events
6
Relationships
7
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Report excerpt / memoir
File Size:
2.44 MB
Summary
This document is an excerpt from a report or memoir by Barak, detailing complex negotiations likely related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It describes a period of uncertainty where Barak initially considered leaving but was persuaded to stay, leading to intense discussions about proposals for holy sites and Jerusalem's sovereignty. The text highlights the involvement of key figures like Danny Yatom, Hassan Asfour, Dennis Ross, Arafat, and President Clinton, focusing on negotiation strategies and the challenges of reaching common ground.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Barak | Narrator / Author |
The document is an excerpt from a text attributed to Barak, likely a memoir or report. He is involved in negotiations...
|
| Danny Yatom | Recipient of instruction |
Told to inform Americans about their departure and plane readiness.
|
| Hassan Asfour | Palestinian negotiator |
One of the original Oslo negotiators, approached Dennis Ross with a new proposal.
|
| Dennis Ross | Recipient of proposal, involved in negotiations |
Approached by Hassan Asfour with a new proposal, then brought it to the narrator.
|
| Arafat | Palestinian leader / negotiator |
Subject of a proposal for negotiations, later met with Clinton, and his team engaged in further probing negotiations.
|
| Clinton | The President (likely Bill Clinton) |
Gave advice, was phoned by the narrator, pleased with the decision to stay, accepted a formula for negotiations, and ...
|
Timeline (8 events)
Narrator decides to leave negotiations and pack bags to return to Israel.
Hassan Asfour proposes a new negotiation formula to Dennis Ross concerning holy sites and Temple Mount sovereignty.
Arafat's team probes Israeli negotiators for further concessions.
Arafat's team
Israeli negotiators
Locations (4)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Home country, destination for plane
|
|
|
Site of holy sites, central to negotiations regarding sovereignty
|
|
|
Holy site, key point of contention in negotiations regarding sovereignty
|
|
|
Where the President (Clinton) was returning from
|
Relationships (6)
I told Danny Yatom to inform the Americans...
Hassan Asfour, had approached Dennis Ross with a new proposal...
When Dennis brought this to me...
At about 11 pm, I phoned the President and told him...
He went to see Arafat and secured – or thought he had secured – his agreement as well.
Key Quotes (7)
"Sovereignty over the Temple Mount would be addressed in later, international negotiations."Source
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Quote #1
"it was an inherently skewed formula: it would involve major Israeli concessions on all the other main issues, without securing our absolute minimum need in Jerusalem: sovereignty over the Temple Mount."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011840.jpg
Quote #2
"if violence broke out after the summit's collapse, we didn't want to feel we'd left any stone unturned."Source
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Quote #3
"any substantive talks needed his involvement"Source
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Quote #4
"If that happened, and if Arafat finally accepted the "pocket" proposals as an agreed starting point, formal negotiations could resume."Source
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Quote #5
"One of the President's great strengths was his genius for blurring the edges of potential differences in search of common ground."Source
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Quote #6
"pushing us to go further – but with no more inclination than before to produce any concessions of their own."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011840.jpg
Quote #7
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,722 characters)
/BARAK/83
I packed my bags. I told Danny Yatom to inform the Americans we were
leaving and to get our plane ready to take us back to Israel. I let the others in our
team know that we were going. A number of them, and several of the Americans as
well, urged me to reconsider. But I said I saw no point in staying. What I didn't
know, however, was that one of the Palestinians' original Oslo negotiators, Hassan
Asfour, had approached Dennis Ross with a new proposal: that we ask Arafat to
accept everything except the proposal on the holy sites as a basis for negotiation.
Sovereignty over the Temple Mount would be addressed in later, international
negotiations. When Dennis brought this to me, my instinct was to say no. Like so
much else at the summit, it was an inherently skewed formula: it would involve
major Israeli concessions on all the other main issues, without securing our
absolute minimum need in Jerusalem: sovereignty over the Temple Mount. I didn't
say yes. Still, with Clinton's words of advice still on my mind, I said that I'd think
it over.
When I met the rest of the Israeli team, almost all of them felt we should stay.
The consensus was that especially if violence broke out after the summit's
collapse, we didn't want to feel we'd left any stone unturned. At about 11 pm, I
phoned the President and told him that we would stay until he returned from
Okinawa. He was clearly pleased, and asked us to keep working in his absence.
When I resisted that, saying that any substantive talks needed his involvement, we
finally agreed that talks could continue in search of a formula for the holy sites. On
all the other issues, only informal discussions would be held until and unless a way
ahead on the Temple Mount was found. If that happened, and if Arafat finally
accepted the "pocket" proposals as an agreed starting point, formal negotiations
could resume. Clinton accepted this formula. He went to see Arafat and secured
or thought he had secured – his agreement as well.
One of the President's great strengths was his genius for blurring the edges of
potential differences in search of common ground. But when edges had to be
sharpened, this could lead to confusion. Before leaving for the G8, the President
neglected to mention to Arafat our explicit understanding that, with the exception
of the talks on the holy sites, nothing would happen until he accepted the
concessions that President Clinton and I had delivered as at least a basis for further
negotiations. As a result, Arafat's team now set about happily asking questions and
probing my negotiators - pushing us to go further – but with no more inclination
than before to produce any concessions of their own.
369
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011840
I packed my bags. I told Danny Yatom to inform the Americans we were
leaving and to get our plane ready to take us back to Israel. I let the others in our
team know that we were going. A number of them, and several of the Americans as
well, urged me to reconsider. But I said I saw no point in staying. What I didn't
know, however, was that one of the Palestinians' original Oslo negotiators, Hassan
Asfour, had approached Dennis Ross with a new proposal: that we ask Arafat to
accept everything except the proposal on the holy sites as a basis for negotiation.
Sovereignty over the Temple Mount would be addressed in later, international
negotiations. When Dennis brought this to me, my instinct was to say no. Like so
much else at the summit, it was an inherently skewed formula: it would involve
major Israeli concessions on all the other main issues, without securing our
absolute minimum need in Jerusalem: sovereignty over the Temple Mount. I didn't
say yes. Still, with Clinton's words of advice still on my mind, I said that I'd think
it over.
When I met the rest of the Israeli team, almost all of them felt we should stay.
The consensus was that especially if violence broke out after the summit's
collapse, we didn't want to feel we'd left any stone unturned. At about 11 pm, I
phoned the President and told him that we would stay until he returned from
Okinawa. He was clearly pleased, and asked us to keep working in his absence.
When I resisted that, saying that any substantive talks needed his involvement, we
finally agreed that talks could continue in search of a formula for the holy sites. On
all the other issues, only informal discussions would be held until and unless a way
ahead on the Temple Mount was found. If that happened, and if Arafat finally
accepted the "pocket" proposals as an agreed starting point, formal negotiations
could resume. Clinton accepted this formula. He went to see Arafat and secured
or thought he had secured – his agreement as well.
One of the President's great strengths was his genius for blurring the edges of
potential differences in search of common ground. But when edges had to be
sharpened, this could lead to confusion. Before leaving for the G8, the President
neglected to mention to Arafat our explicit understanding that, with the exception
of the talks on the holy sites, nothing would happen until he accepted the
concessions that President Clinton and I had delivered as at least a basis for further
negotiations. As a result, Arafat's team now set about happily asking questions and
probing my negotiators - pushing us to go further – but with no more inclination
than before to produce any concessions of their own.
369
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011840
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