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760 KB

Extraction Summary

7
People
2
Organizations
1
Locations
1
Events
0
Relationships
3
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Legal document
File Size: 760 KB
Summary

This legal document, filed on April 16, 2021, is a portion of a legal argument defending an indictment against a motion to dismiss. The argument asserts that using pseudonyms for minor victims and providing an approximate date range (1994-1997) for the alleged crimes is legally sound, citing precedents like Stringer, Kidd, and Stavroulakis. It further argues the defendant is not prejudiced, as the government has provided and will provide specific details, such as victim birth information and witness names, during discovery.

People (7)

Name Role Context
Marrero Judge
Cited as the judge who denied a motion to dismiss in the Stringer case.
Stringer Defendant
A defendant in a cited legal case (Stringer's holding).
Kidd Defendant
A defendant in a cited legal case.
Stavroulakis
Name associated with a cited legal case (Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d at 693).
Tramunti
Name associated with a legal case quoted within the Stavroulakis citation.
Nersesian Defendant
Defendant in the cited case United States v. Nersesian.
Vickers Defendant
Defendant in the cited case United States v. Vickers.

Organizations (2)

Name Type Context
Government government agency
Mentioned as having provided discovery and promising to provide witness names.
Courts in the Second Circuit Judicial Body
Mentioned as having consistently upheld indictments with a range of time rather than a specific date.

Timeline (1 events)

between 1994 and 1997
The defendant allegedly engaged in a continuing course of conduct involving the enticement and transportation of minors with intent to commit illegal sex acts, as well as conspiracies to do so.
defendant minor victims

Locations (1)

Location Context
Referenced as the jurisdiction where courts have upheld certain types of indictments.

Key Quotes (3)

"that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim’s identity to the charge"
Source
— Judge Marrero (From the holding in the Stringer case, found by Judge Marrero, regarding victim identity in indictments.)
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Quote #1
"state[s] the time and place (in approximate terms)"
Source
— Stavroulakis case (Describing what an indictment does, quoted from the Stavroulakis case.)
DOJ-OGR-00003115.jpg
Quote #2
"[Th]e Second Circuit routinely upholds the ‘on or about’ language used to describe the window of when a violation occurred."
Source
— Kidd case (A quote from the Kidd case citation, explaining the Second Circuit's stance on using approximate timeframes in indictments.)
DOJ-OGR-00003115.jpg
Quote #3

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,283 characters)

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 181 of 239
is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Marrero found Stringer’s holding “that the identity of a victim was not required to be contained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim’s identity to the charge” to be equally applicable in a case involving sex trafficking charges. Id. at 369. The same logic follows here. The use of pseudonyms to refer to the minor victims of sexual abuse in Counts One through Four is no more prejudicial to the defendant here than the absence of victim identities was to the defendants in Kidd or Stringer. This is especially so when the Government has already provided the defendant with the birth month and year of each victim, provided discovery regarding each victim, and has repeatedly indicated that it will provide the defendant with the names of its witnesses, including the minor victims referenced in the Indictment, four weeks in advance of trial. Such disclosure will ensure that the defendant is readily able to bar future prosecutions for the same offense, and together with the elements of each crime and additional details contained in in the Indictment, is more than sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Second, the Indictment “state[s] the time and place (in approximate terms)” of the conduct alleged in Counts One through Four. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d at 693 (quoting Tramunti, 513 F.2d at 1113). In particular, Counts One through Four each allege that the defendant engaged in a continuing course of conduct involving the enticement and transportation of minors with intent to commit illegal sex acts, as well as conspiracies to do so, between in or about 1994 and in or about 1997. See Indictment ¶¶ 1, 6, 7, 9-11, 13, 15-17, 19. Courts in the Second Circuit have consistently upheld indictments containing a range of time rather than a specific date. See, e.g., Kidd, 386. F. Supp. 3d at 369 (“[Th]e Second Circuit routinely upholds the ‘on or about’ language used to describe the window of when a violation occurred.” (citing United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)); United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL
154
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