DOJ-OGR-00010336.jpg
760 KB
Extraction Summary
3
People
4
Organizations
1
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Court order / legal opinion
File Size:
760 KB
Summary
This document is page 13 of a court order filed on April 1, 2022, in the case against Ghislaine Maxwell. The text analyzes a motion regarding juror misconduct, specifically discussing the 'McDonough' test. The Court concludes that the juror's false answers during voir dire were not deliberate and that the second prong of the legal test was not satisfied. It also defines legal standards for actual, implied, and inferable bias.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ghislaine Maxwell | Defendant |
Referred to as 'the Defendant'; her legal team argues that inadvertent false statements by a juror satisfy the McDono...
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| Juror | Subject of Inquiry |
Unnamed juror whose conduct during voir dire is being analyzed for potential misconduct/false answers.
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| The Court | Judge/Adjudicator |
Analyzing the legal arguments regarding juror misconduct.
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Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| The Government |
Prosecution team arguing that deliberate falsehood is required for juror misconduct.
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| Second Circuit Court of Appeals |
Referenced for legal precedents (Shaoul, Greer, Stewart, Torres).
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| National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers |
Organization that filed an amicus curiae brief arguing deliberateness is not required.
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| DOJ |
Department of Justice (indicated in footer stamp DOJ-OGR).
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Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Implied by case number 1:20-cr-00330-PAE.
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Relationships (1)
The document contrasts arguments from the 'Defendant' (Maxwell) and 'The Government'.
Key Quotes (3)
"The Court finds that the false answers were not deliberate and that the second prong of McDonough is not satisfied."Source
DOJ-OGR-00010336.jpg
Quote #1
"Under the second prong of McDonough, the Court “must determine if it would have granted the hypothetical challenge” for cause if the juror had responded accurately."Source
DOJ-OGR-00010336.jpg
Quote #2
"“Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse"Source
DOJ-OGR-00010336.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,320 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 13 of 40
The parties dispute whether the first prong of McDonough requires “deliberate juror
misconduct”—that is, whether the juror must have deliberately provided a false answer in voir
dire. The Government, relying on Second Circuit precedent such as United States v. Shaoul,
argues that a deliberate falsehood is required. Gov. Br. at 13 (citing Shaoul, 41 F.3d at 815–16).
In contrast, the Defendant contends that McDonough does not require deliberateness and that an
inadvertent false statement satisfies the first prong. Maxwell Br. at 23–28; Maxwell Reply at 9–
14, Dkt. No. 644.³ The Court does not resolve this legal dispute because, as explained in the
analysis section below, regardless of which approach is the correct one, the Court finds that the
false answers were not deliberate and that the second prong of McDonough is not satisfied.
misconduct”—that is, whether the juror must have deliberately provided a false answer in voir
dire. The Government, relying on Second Circuit precedent such as United States v. Shaoul,
argues that a deliberate falsehood is required. Gov. Br. at 13 (citing Shaoul, 41 F.3d at 815–16).
In contrast, the Defendant contends that McDonough does not require deliberateness and that an
inadvertent false statement satisfies the first prong. Maxwell Br. at 23–28; Maxwell Reply at 9–
14, Dkt. No. 644.³ The Court does not resolve this legal dispute because, as explained in the
analysis section below, regardless of which approach is the correct one, the Court finds that the
false answers were not deliberate and that the second prong of McDonough is not satisfied.
Under the second prong of McDonough, the Court “must determine if it would have
granted the hypothetical challenge” for cause if the juror had responded accurately. United
States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 304
(2d Cir. 2006). “Challenges for cause are generally based on actual bias, implied bias, or
inferable bias.” Greer, 285 F.3d at 171. These categories do not always elucidate the analysis
and there is overlap (and sometimes confusion) in how they are discussed in some of the cases.
Nevertheless, it is important to attempt to delineate. Actual bias is “bias in fact,” due either to
the juror admitting partiality or a judge finding actual partiality based on the juror’s voir dire
answers. United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997). Implied bias is “bias
presumed as a matter of law” due to a juror’s relationship to the parties or connection to the
actual crime itself. Greer, 285 F.3d at 171–72. Finally, a judge may infer bias when actual or
implied bias does not apply. “Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a
risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse
granted the hypothetical challenge” for cause if the juror had responded accurately. United
States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 304
(2d Cir. 2006). “Challenges for cause are generally based on actual bias, implied bias, or
inferable bias.” Greer, 285 F.3d at 171. These categories do not always elucidate the analysis
and there is overlap (and sometimes confusion) in how they are discussed in some of the cases.
Nevertheless, it is important to attempt to delineate. Actual bias is “bias in fact,” due either to
the juror admitting partiality or a judge finding actual partiality based on the juror’s voir dire
answers. United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997). Implied bias is “bias
presumed as a matter of law” due to a juror’s relationship to the parties or connection to the
actual crime itself. Greer, 285 F.3d at 171–72. Finally, a judge may infer bias when actual or
implied bias does not apply. “Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a
risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse
³ In an amicus curiae brief, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers also argues that deliberateness is
not required under McDonough. See Dkt. No. 614.
not required under McDonough. See Dkt. No. 614.
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DOJ-OGR-00010336
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