HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018107.jpg
2.58 MB
Extraction Summary
2
People
3
Organizations
4
Locations
1
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Policy paper / strategic analysis report (page 23)
File Size:
2.58 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 23 of a strategic policy paper or intelligence report analyzing potential military options regarding Iran. It discusses targeting the IRGC and nuclear infrastructure, the requirements for a 'regime-change option,' and the risks of escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. The text specifically highlights the complexity of ending such a conflict, noting that Iranian proxies like Hizballah might continue fighting even if the Iranian state surrenders. The page bears the Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018107.
People (2)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Iranian leaders | Government Officials |
Mentioned in the context of surrendering or agreeing to a truce.
|
| Hizballah leaders | Militant Group Leaders |
Mentioned as potentially not adhering to a truce agreed upon by Iranian leaders.
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Republic (IRGC) |
Described as the regime's praetorian guard and shock troops; a target of potential military campaigns.
|
|
| Hizballah |
Mentioned as a proxy force that might continue hostilities even if Iran surrenders.
|
|
| United States |
Mentioned as a primary belligerent in a hypothetical U.S.-Iranian war.
|
Timeline (1 events)
Locations (4)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Target of the hypothetical military campaign.
|
|
|
Strategic location that might require ground forces to secure.
|
|
|
Strategic location mentioned alongside the Strait of Hormuz.
|
|
|
Hypothetical combatant.
|
Relationships (2)
Document notes Iranian leaders might be unable to enforce decisions on Hizballah leaders.
Discusses scenarios of a U.S.-Iranian war.
Key Quotes (3)
"This campaign would aim to severely damage the nuclear program, limit Iran’s ability to defend against the attack... and reduce its capabilities for post-attack retaliation."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018107.jpg
Quote #1
"A regime-change option would require a broad military offensive that could include nuclear facilities, air defenses, Iran’s retaliatory capabilities, leadership targets, regime supporters, and national infrastructure and economic targets."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018107.jpg
Quote #2
"Whose war would this be?"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018107.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,038 characters)
23
command centers, offensive missile forces, naval forces and the Army
of the Guardians of the Islamic Republic (IRGC), the regime’s
praetorian guard and shock troops. This campaign would aim to
severely damage the nuclear program, limit Iran’s ability to defend
against the attack (and subsequent restrikes, if necessary) and reduce
its capabilities for post-attack retaliation.
A regime-change option would require a broad military offensive that
could include nuclear facilities, air defenses, Iran’s retaliatory
capabilities, leadership targets, regime supporters, and national
infrastructure and economic targets. This could include putting some
forces on the ground to collect intelligence and neutralize specific
targets that are difficult to strike effectively with air power. No large-
scale ground operations are likely, but they cannot be ruled out at
some levels of conflict and in some scenarios, such as those that posit
a need to open and secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz and
Persian Gulf.
In general, the more expansive a war’s goals as a plan escalates from
strike to campaign to broad offensive, the greater the force needed to
achieve those goals, the greater the uncertainty in achieving them,
and the greater the consequences of both success and failure.
Moreover, a war’s goals at the outset of conflict may not remain
stable. Early sudden successes or unanticipated failures can lead to
the escalation of initially limited goals, particularly if terminating
hostilities proves difficult. Lateral expansion as well as escalation is
also possible: Iranian leaders might surrender or agree to a truce but
be unable to enforce a similar decision on Hizballah leaders or terror
agents around the world. This leads to yet another layer of complexity
and uncertainty: Whose war would this be?
A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the United
States and Iran alone. Each would have partners or allies, both
willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding
of the Guardians of the Islamic Republic (IRGC), the regime’s
praetorian guard and shock troops. This campaign would aim to
severely damage the nuclear program, limit Iran’s ability to defend
against the attack (and subsequent restrikes, if necessary) and reduce
its capabilities for post-attack retaliation.
A regime-change option would require a broad military offensive that
could include nuclear facilities, air defenses, Iran’s retaliatory
capabilities, leadership targets, regime supporters, and national
infrastructure and economic targets. This could include putting some
forces on the ground to collect intelligence and neutralize specific
targets that are difficult to strike effectively with air power. No large-
scale ground operations are likely, but they cannot be ruled out at
some levels of conflict and in some scenarios, such as those that posit
a need to open and secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz and
Persian Gulf.
In general, the more expansive a war’s goals as a plan escalates from
strike to campaign to broad offensive, the greater the force needed to
achieve those goals, the greater the uncertainty in achieving them,
and the greater the consequences of both success and failure.
Moreover, a war’s goals at the outset of conflict may not remain
stable. Early sudden successes or unanticipated failures can lead to
the escalation of initially limited goals, particularly if terminating
hostilities proves difficult. Lateral expansion as well as escalation is
also possible: Iranian leaders might surrender or agree to a truce but
be unable to enforce a similar decision on Hizballah leaders or terror
agents around the world. This leads to yet another layer of complexity
and uncertainty: Whose war would this be?
A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the United
States and Iran alone. Each would have partners or allies, both
willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018107
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