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would be to accept their losses, declare “victory” because the regime
survived, lick their wounds, prepare for indirect retaliation, and
resume nuclear activities on a clandestine basis. But a war might not
end cleanly, and the U.S. administration could find itself in a messy
and protracted conflict. This suggests the need for both an expansive
approach to net assessment and deep and broad preparation not just
of the military but also of the “home front” and the economy, for Iran
may choose to fight on these fronts as well as within its own borders
and in the region.
How well prepared is the United States for this kind of fight? This is
at least in part a question of national or societal resilience. If all
options are on the table, as both Bush and Obama Administration
spokesmen have insisted, are preparations for employing all options
being made ready? If not, then Iran may decide that some of the
options on the table lack credibility.
The second conclusion we should take from this discussion is that, in
attacking Iran, we would be trading one set of risks for another. Any
option we choose, even choosing not to choose, will have political as
well as military-strategic consequences. As hard as it is to know the
consequences of war, it is just as hard to know the consequences of a
decision to “learn to live” with a nuclear-armed Iran. Both courses
are fraught and logically open-ended. Thus the fear of potentially
negative consequences from a war should not necessarily rule one
out. Winston Churchill, reflecting on British policy before World
War II, wrote:
If the circumstances are such as to warrant it, force may be used. And
if this be so, it should be used under the conditions which are most
favourable. There is no merit in putting off a war for a year if, when it
comes, it is a far worse war or one much harder to win.17
In any case, if the United States decides to attack Iran it should
certainly look before it leaps and prepare itself for a hard landing.

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