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Legal document
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Summary
This legal document, a court opinion, concludes that an individual named Cosby reasonably relied on a decision by former District Attorney Castor not to prosecute him. The court asserts that Castor intended for this reliance to occur, which led Cosby to incriminate himself in four depositions, thereby depriving him of his Fifth Amendment rights. The court maintains that the absence of a formal, written promise does not negate the violation of Cosby's due process rights, as his detrimental reliance is evident from the record.
People (2)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Cosby |
Mentioned throughout as the individual who relied on D.A. Castor's decision not to prosecute, leading to self-incrimi...
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| D.A. Castor | Former district attorney |
The official whose decision not to prosecute Cosby is the central subject. The document states his actions were desig...
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Timeline (2 events)
D.A. Castor's decision not to prosecute Cosby.
Relationships (1)
The document establishes that Cosby relied on D.A. Castor's decision not to prosecute him. The court found this reliance was reasonable and was the intended result of Castor's actions, leading Cosby to incriminate himself.
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (3,091 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 69 of 80
We already have determined that Cosby in fact relied upon D.A. Castor’s decision.
We now conclude that Cosby’s reliance was reasonable, and that it also was reasonable
for D.A. Castor to expect Cosby to so rely. The record establishes without contradiction
that depriving Cosby of his Fifth Amendment right was D.A. Castor’s intended result.²⁷
His actions were specifically designed to that end. The former district attorney may have
equivocated or contradicted himself years later with regard to how he endeavored to
achieve that result, but there has never been any question as to what he intended to
achieve. There can be no doubt that, by choosing not to prosecute Cosby and then
We now conclude that Cosby’s reliance was reasonable, and that it also was reasonable
for D.A. Castor to expect Cosby to so rely. The record establishes without contradiction
that depriving Cosby of his Fifth Amendment right was D.A. Castor’s intended result.²⁷
His actions were specifically designed to that end. The former district attorney may have
equivocated or contradicted himself years later with regard to how he endeavored to
achieve that result, but there has never been any question as to what he intended to
achieve. There can be no doubt that, by choosing not to prosecute Cosby and then
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²⁷ The dissent asserts that we have predicated our decision upon the existence of an
“unwritten promise,” which was rejected by the trial court’s credibility findings. D.O. at 3.
To the contrary. As we explained earlier, we have accepted the trial court’s findings in
this regard, and those findings, which are supported by the record, are binding on this
Court. See, supra, page 48 (citing O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1199 (Pa. 2001)). However,
our deference is limited to the factual findings only; we may draw our own inferences
therefrom and reach our own legal conclusions. See In re Pruner’s Est., 162 A.2d at 631.
Thus, the trial court’s factual finding that no formal bargained-for-exchange, written or
unwritten, occurred does not constrain our legal analysis, nor does it in any way serve to
immunize D.A. Castor’s actions from constitutional scrutiny. That there was no formal
promise does not mean that Cosby no longer had due process rights.
²⁷ The dissent asserts that we have predicated our decision upon the existence of an
“unwritten promise,” which was rejected by the trial court’s credibility findings. D.O. at 3.
To the contrary. As we explained earlier, we have accepted the trial court’s findings in
this regard, and those findings, which are supported by the record, are binding on this
Court. See, supra, page 48 (citing O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1199 (Pa. 2001)). However,
our deference is limited to the factual findings only; we may draw our own inferences
therefrom and reach our own legal conclusions. See In re Pruner’s Est., 162 A.2d at 631.
Thus, the trial court’s factual finding that no formal bargained-for-exchange, written or
unwritten, occurred does not constrain our legal analysis, nor does it in any way serve to
immunize D.A. Castor’s actions from constitutional scrutiny. That there was no formal
promise does not mean that Cosby no longer had due process rights.
The trial court’s credibility finding regarding the existence vel non of a particular
promise does not allow us to ignore the remainder of the overwhelming evidence of
record. The record firmly establishes that D.A. Castor’s desired result was to strip Cosby
of his Fifth Amendment rights. This patent and developed fact stands separate and apart
from the trial court’s finding that D.A. Castor never extended a formal promise.
promise does not allow us to ignore the remainder of the overwhelming evidence of
record. The record firmly establishes that D.A. Castor’s desired result was to strip Cosby
of his Fifth Amendment rights. This patent and developed fact stands separate and apart
from the trial court’s finding that D.A. Castor never extended a formal promise.
The dissent would ignore the undeniable reality that Cosby relied to his detriment
upon D.A. Castor’s decision. The dissent does so by shifting the perspective from D.A.
Castor’s actions to Cosby’s, focusing in particular upon the fact that Cosby did not record
the purported agreement or reduce it to writing. As we note in this opinion, in this context,
neither a promise, nor an agreement, nor a contract, nor evidence of reliance derives
legal validity only upon being recorded or upon written materialization. The law knows no
such prerequisite, and Cosby cannot be punished for failing to comply with a legal
requirement that does not exist. The proof of Cosby’s reliance is plain on the face of the
record. It is the fact that, upon the advice and assistance of counsel, Cosby sat for four
depositions and incriminated himself, obviously a decision made after and in direct
reliance upon D.A. Castor’s decision.
upon D.A. Castor’s decision. The dissent does so by shifting the perspective from D.A.
Castor’s actions to Cosby’s, focusing in particular upon the fact that Cosby did not record
the purported agreement or reduce it to writing. As we note in this opinion, in this context,
neither a promise, nor an agreement, nor a contract, nor evidence of reliance derives
legal validity only upon being recorded or upon written materialization. The law knows no
such prerequisite, and Cosby cannot be punished for failing to comply with a legal
requirement that does not exist. The proof of Cosby’s reliance is plain on the face of the
record. It is the fact that, upon the advice and assistance of counsel, Cosby sat for four
depositions and incriminated himself, obviously a decision made after and in direct
reliance upon D.A. Castor’s decision.
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DOJ-OGR-00004881
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