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jurisdiction). "If a plaintiff has identified a genuine issue of jurisdictional fact, jurisdictional discovery is appropriate even in the absence of a prima facie showing as to the existence of jurisdiction." Daventree, 349 F.Supp.2d 736 at 761, 2004 WL 2997881, at *20 (citing In re Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 207–08). Courts are not obligated to subject a foreign defendant to discovery, however, where the allegations of jurisdictional facts, construed in plaintiffs' favor, fail to state a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction or where discovery would not uncover sufficient facts to sustain jurisdiction. Id. (citing Jazini, 148 F.3d at 183–85 (granting motion to dismiss and denying jurisdictional discovery where complaint was described as "sparse" and "conclusory")); see also Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., Consolidated, Nos. 97 Civ. 2262, 98 Civ. 9186(MBM), 2000 WL 284222, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2000) (granting motion to dismiss and denying request for jurisdictional discovery where the complaint stated, without any supporting facts, that the defendant "participates in a 'multinational insurance arrangement' present in the State of New York"); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria, 230 F.Supp.2d at 410–413 (granting motion to dismiss and denying jurisdictional discovery where complaint only contained conclusory allegations).

D. Application of Plaintiffs' Theories to Moving Defendants

1. Prince Sultan

The Court outlined the allegations against Prince Sultan in Part I.B.1. With respect to Prince Sultan's contacts with the United States, Plaintiffs allege that "Saudi Royal family members own substantial assets in the United States of America, and do substantial business in the United States of America, the profits of which in part, are used to fund international terrorist acts, including those which led to the murderous attacks of September 11, 2001." See Ashton Complaint ¶ 296. There is no indication of whether these unspecified members of the Royal family include Prince Sultan. Most Plaintiffs also claim Prince Sultan is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of Saudi Arabia Airlines, "which does business in the United States and internationally." Burnett Complaint ¶ 340; Ashton Complaint ¶ 253; Barrera Complaint ¶ 255; Salvo Complaint ¶ 245; Tremsky Complaint ¶ 180. The Federal Plaintiffs do not make a similar allegation.

[57] To the extent these allegations are an attempt to establish general jurisdiction over Prince Sultan, they are insufficient. See In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 245 F.Supp.2d 117, 130 (D.D.C.2003) (refusing to hold that control status in foreign corporation with United States office is sufficient for personal jurisdiction over individual); Cornell, 2000 WL 284222, at *2 (granting motion to dismiss where complaint contained one conclusory statement regarding jurisdiction); Family Internet, Inc. v. Cybernex, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 0637(RWS), 1999 WL 796177, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1999) (holding that personal jurisdiction must be individually established over corporate officers even when the court has personal jurisdiction over the corporation itself).

[58] Proceeding under the purposefully directed activities theory of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs argue that Prince Sultan knew or should have known the organizations to which he donated were funneling money to al Qaeda and that al Qaeda's primary target was the United States. Consol. Plaintiffs' Opp. at 23. Prince Sultan argues that his alleged actions cannot satisfy the minimum contacts requirement since the Second Circuit's recent description of Calder requires "primary participation in intentional wrongdoing." See

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