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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page85 of 113

what he might have said in voir dire four months earlier, had he been truthful, were

pointless.

2. FRE 606 Did Not Prevent Inquiry into Juror 50’s Use of Prior Abuse in Persuading Jury to Convict Maxwell

The court erred in applying Federal Rule of Evidence 606 to preclude any testimony from Juror 50 about his statements to journalists.

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) precludes a juror from testifying about deliberations and jurors’ mental processes in the course thereof but allows testimony regarding extraneous prejudicial information, i.e., when certain outside influences on the jury are involved. Rule 606(b) expressly authorizes jurors to testify as to “extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside influences.” The rationale behind 606(b) is the need to prevent post-trial scrutiny, the harassment of former jurors by losing parties, and to promote juror privacy. See, Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).

In this case, however, we are not faced with a conflict between policy considerations underlying Rule 606(b). Indeed, such public policy concerns are inapplicable in this case, where the juror, on his own, broadcast his experiences and the role he played in jury deliberations. Inquiry into these statements does not risk exposing a juror to harassment or intimidation. In fact, the only reason the

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