DOJ-OGR-00010374.jpg
726 KB
Extraction Summary
5
People
2
Organizations
2
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
726 KB
Summary
This legal document, page 8 of a filing in case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE dated April 29, 2022, analyzes the legal distinctions between two conspiracy charges, Count Three and Count Five. The author argues that despite being charged under the same statute, the counts are not multiplicitous because they have different statutory objectives, legal definitions (e.g., of a 'minor'), and required elements of intent, citing precedents like Macchia, Estrada, and Villa. The document refutes the Government's claim that a single distinguishing factor is dispositive in this analysis.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Macchia |
Cited in a legal case precedent (Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669 and 668).
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| Korfant |
Referenced in the 'Korfant factor', a legal test or standard.
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| Estrada |
Cited in a legal case precedent (Estrada, 320 F.3d at 182).
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| Villa |
Cited as a defendant in a legal case precedent (United States v. Villa).
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| Hernandez |
Cited in a legal case precedent (Hernandez, 2009 WL 3169226).
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Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States Government | government agency |
Referred to as 'the Government' and 'United States' in the context of the prosecution and federal law.
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| DOJ-OGR | government agency |
Appears in the footer as part of a document identifier (DOJ-OGR-00010374).
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Locations (2)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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Mentioned in the context of an offense against the United States.
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Mentioned in a case citation, referring to the District of Connecticut.
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Relationships (1)
The Government
→
adversarial (legal)
→
The Defendant
The document outlines the Government's legal arguments against the Defendant's 'multiplicity claim'.
Key Quotes (4)
"general level"Source
— Unknown (quoted by the author of the document)
(Describing the similarity between two counts before detailing their differences.)
DOJ-OGR-00010374.jpg
Quote #1
"commit theft from an interstate shipment and to transport stolen property across state lines"Source
— United States v. Villa case summary
(Used as an example of a § 371 conspiracy.)
DOJ-OGR-00010374.jpg
Quote #2
"sell stolen property"Source
— United States v. Villa case summary
(Used as an example of a separate conspiracy from the theft and transport of stolen property.)
DOJ-OGR-00010374.jpg
Quote #3
"fatal"Source
— The Government
(The Government's suggestion that a single legal factor is 'fatal' to the Defendant's claim, which the court document refutes.)
DOJ-OGR-00010374.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,128 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 8 of 45
met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the counts are not
multiplicitous.
multiplicitous.
The offenses charged and common objectives. Both Counts Three and Five are charged
under the same statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United
States. But going beyond this “general level” of similarity, the statutory objectives of the two
counts differ. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669. Count Three is a conspiracy to violate § 2423(a) and
Count Five a conspiracy to violate § 1591. These differing statutory objectives entail legal
differences. Count Three, for example, charges unlawful sexual activity (defined as sexual
touching of a minor) while Count Five charges commercial sexual activity with a minor. And
each provision defines “minor” differently: under seventeen years old for Count Three but under
eighteen years old for Count Five. Further, Count Three requires an agreement with intent to
transport across state lines, while Count Five’s agreement requires only intent of sexual activity
that affects interstate commerce. These differences push the first Korfant factor in the
Government’s favor. See Estrada, 320 F.3d at 182 (distinguishing between a conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and one to distribute crack); United States v. Villa, No. 3:12-CR-40 (JBA),
2014 WL 252013, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2014), aff’d, 744 F. App’x 716 (2d Cir. 2018)
(summary order) (distinguishing between a § 371 conspiracy to “commit theft from an interstate
shipment and to transport stolen property across state lines” and one to “sell stolen property”).
under the same statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United
States. But going beyond this “general level” of similarity, the statutory objectives of the two
counts differ. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669. Count Three is a conspiracy to violate § 2423(a) and
Count Five a conspiracy to violate § 1591. These differing statutory objectives entail legal
differences. Count Three, for example, charges unlawful sexual activity (defined as sexual
touching of a minor) while Count Five charges commercial sexual activity with a minor. And
each provision defines “minor” differently: under seventeen years old for Count Three but under
eighteen years old for Count Five. Further, Count Three requires an agreement with intent to
transport across state lines, while Count Five’s agreement requires only intent of sexual activity
that affects interstate commerce. These differences push the first Korfant factor in the
Government’s favor. See Estrada, 320 F.3d at 182 (distinguishing between a conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and one to distribute crack); United States v. Villa, No. 3:12-CR-40 (JBA),
2014 WL 252013, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2014), aff’d, 744 F. App’x 716 (2d Cir. 2018)
(summary order) (distinguishing between a § 371 conspiracy to “commit theft from an interstate
shipment and to transport stolen property across state lines” and one to “sell stolen property”).
The Government, however, errs in suggesting that this factor alone is “fatal” to the
Defendant’s multiplicity claim. Gov. Br. at 29. To the contrary, no single Korfant factor is
dominant or dispositive. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 668. And courts in this district have found two
conspiracy counts to be the same offense even when they have different statutory objectives
because both counts can arise from the same agreement. E.g., Hernandez, 2009 WL 3169226, at
Defendant’s multiplicity claim. Gov. Br. at 29. To the contrary, no single Korfant factor is
dominant or dispositive. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 668. And courts in this district have found two
conspiracy counts to be the same offense even when they have different statutory objectives
because both counts can arise from the same agreement. E.g., Hernandez, 2009 WL 3169226, at
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DOJ-OGR-00010374
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