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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 35 Filed 07/29/20 Page 2 of 5

The Honorable Alison J. Nathan
July 29, 2020
Page 2

of course, has not had access to the discovery materials) to anticipate and respond to government
hypotheticals regarding what the discovery might contain, and how language might address such
hypotheticals. But that is not the standard.

The defense submits that when the relevant privacy interests are appropriately
considered, it should not be restricted from publicly referencing individuals who have chosen to
publicly identify themselves. Accordingly, the defense has proposed that the protective order
include the following language: “Nor does this Order prohibit Defense Counsel from publicly
referencing individuals who have spoken on the public record to the media or in public fora, or in
litigation – criminal or otherwise – relating to Jeffrey Epstein or Ghislaine Maxwell.” (Dkt. 29,
Ex. A ¶ 6).

In the present context, many of the alleged victims have chosen to identify themselves by
name in numerous public fora, including: self-identifying and speaking on the record in criminal
proceedings in the Jeffrey Epstein case and this case; as named plaintiffs in civil suits against
Ms. Maxwell and others; in on-the-record interviews with media and tabloid publications and
newspaper articles; publishing memoirs; appearing on air in Netflix documentaries and other
television and film productions; appearing in YouTube videos; and making, in their own name,
all manner of social media posts. Indeed, a Google search will reveal any number of videos and
articles in which alleged victims not only identify themselves, but make specific allegations
against Ms. Maxwell. As a matter of common sense, and under the law, such persons do not
have any privacy interest that needs to be addressed by the proposed order. See Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (noting, in a case where the identity of a minor rape
victim was disclosed in publicly filed indictments, that “the interests in privacy fade when the
information involved already appears on the public record.”).

Yet, the government asserts that such persons nevertheless have “significant privacy
interests” (Gov’t Resp. at 1), and proposes the much more limited formulation: “This Order does
not prohibit Defense Counsel from publicly referencing individuals who have spoken by name
on the public record in this case” – i.e., in United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330
(AJN). (Dkt. 33, Ex. A ¶ 5 (emphasis added)). As a practical matter, the government’s proposed
language would permit the defense to publicly reference a total of one person – the individual
who spoke under her own name at Ms. Maxwell’s bail hearing. (See Tr. at 40). It would not
include the 11 alleged victims who spoke or submitted letters under their own names at the
August 27, 2019 hearing in United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, 19-CR-00490-RMB, even though
five of those individuals made allegations against Ms. Maxwell. (See Dkt. 53 at 43-44, 55, 56,
57, 58). It would not include the four individuals who have civilly sued Ms. Maxwell under their
own names alleging conduct similar to that alleged in the indictment. Nor would it include
numerous other individuals, described above, who have spoken out publicly to the press or on
social media and made accusations against Ms. Maxwell. Indeed, the government’s proposed
language is even more restrictive than what they previously agreed to in the Epstein case, which
allowed Epstein’s counsel to publicly reference individuals who had identified themselves in

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