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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page76 of 93

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reviewing thirteen days of evidence that persuaded twelve jurors of the Defendant’s guilt.” (A.352). Actual and inferred bias are both committed to the province of the trial judge, and Judge Nathan’s findings that neither existed were not clearly erroneous. See Torres, 128 F.3d at 44 (“[A] finding of actual bias is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[A] finding of inferred bias is, by definition, within the discretion of the trial court.”).

Maxwell also argues that Judge Nathan should have implied bias, highlighting some similarities between Juror 50’s sexual abuse and the sexual abuse discussed at trial. (Br.67). That falls far short of requiring the District Court to imply bias. First, as Judge Nathan explained, the law is not that “bias must be implied when a juror has a personal experience similar to the issues at trial.” (A.349). Rather, this Court has “consistently refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly on the circumstances of a given case.” (A.349 (quoting Torres, 128 F.3d at 46)). This case is not within one of the rare, extreme circumstances where a mandatory presumption of bias applies. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45; Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. Second, although there are some similarities between Juror 50’s childhood sexual abuse, there are also differences: Juror 50 was younger than the trial victims at the time of their abuse, he was abused by a family member, and he disclosed his abuse much earlier. (A.350). And critically,

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