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652 KB

Extraction Summary

2
People
4
Organizations
0
Locations
1
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Legal filing / appellate brief
File Size: 652 KB
Summary

This page from a legal filing (Case 20-3061, dated Sept 28, 2020) outlines a dispute over appellate jurisdiction. Ms. Maxwell is requesting permission to share facts with another judge under seal. The document argues against the government's position that the court lacks jurisdiction, asserting that Judge Nathan's previous order meets the requirements of the 'collateral order doctrine' despite the government's strict interpretation.

People (2)

Name Role Context
Ghislaine Maxwell Defendant/Appellant
Requesting permission to share facts with another judge; subject of the appeal.
Judge Nathan District Court Judge
Issued the order being appealed which 'conclusively determined the disputed question'.

Organizations (4)

Name Type Context
The Government
Arguing against jurisdiction for the appeal.
Article III judge
Recipient of facts Ms. Maxwell wishes to share.
Midland Asphalt Corp.
Cited in case law regarding collateral order doctrine.
United States
Cited in case law (Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States; Flanagan v. United States).

Timeline (1 events)

2020-09-28
Legal argument regarding jurisdiction and the collateral order doctrine in Case 20-3061.
Appellate Court (implied)
Ms. Maxwell The Government

Relationships (2)

Ghislaine Maxwell Legal/Judicial Judge Nathan
Maxwell is appealing Judge Nathan's order.
Ghislaine Maxwell Adversarial The Government
Opposing sides in the legal argument regarding jurisdiction.

Key Quotes (4)

"Ms. Maxwell asks is for permission to share, under seal, the relevant facts with another Article III judge."
Source
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Quote #1
"The government is wrong."
Source
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Quote #2
"Judge Nathan’s order (1) conclusively determined the disputed question, (2) it resolved an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) it is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."
Source
DOJ-OGR-00019596.jpg
Quote #3
"the collateral order doctrine must be interpreted 'with the utmost strictness in criminal cases.'"
Source
DOJ-OGR-00019596.jpg
Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (1,491 characters)

Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page5 of 15
Ms. Maxwell asks is for permission to share, under seal, the relevant facts with
another Article III judge.
The government argues there is no jurisdiction for this Court to consider this
appeal. Doc. 37. Quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, the government
says the collateral order doctrine must be interpreted “with the utmost strictness in
criminal cases.” 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465
U.S. 259, 265 (1984)). Doc. 37 at 8. According to the government, in criminal cases
the doctrine applies only to orders denying a bond, orders denying a motion to
dismiss on double jeopardy ground, orders denying a motion to dismiss under the
Speech and Debate Clause, and orders permitting the forced administration of
antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial. Doc. 37 at 9. The
government is wrong.
To be sure, this appeal does not concern one of the four types of orders
identified by the government. But that doesn’t mean the appeal isn’t proper under
the collateral order doctrine, particularly when there is no serious argument that it
satisfies each of the doctrine’s three requirements: Judge Nathan’s order
(1) conclusively determined the disputed question, (2) it resolved an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) it is effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Will, 546 U.S. at 349.
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DOJ-OGR-00019596

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