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those working for the harshest congressional critics of China's crackdown. One trip in December 1989 featured very heated debates with Chinese officials, especially after it was announced that National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger were also in Beijing for talks with Chinese leaders and that the two had made an earlier secret trip in July, soon after the crackdown. As the Bush administration had publicly promised Congress that all such contacts would end, the staff delegates' anger at and criticism of China's repression was compounded by their harsh reaction to the Bush administration's actions.

As US-China relations continued during a tumultuous post-Tiananmen crackdown period, Congress played important roles on such key issues as the debate over most-favored nation tariff treatment, the visit of Taiwan's president to the United States in 1995, and the decision to approve China's entry into the World Trade Organization. The Chinese government endeavored to build influence with and gain access to Congress by encouraging US businesses to lobby Congress on China's behalf and by continuing to receive member and staff delegations in China.

Other entities in the Chinese official structure, including the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese military, at times attempted to gain access to Congress. The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party engaged in growing exchanges with the major American political parties on a party-to-party basis. A Chinese "united front" organization, the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAIFU), managed some of these ensuing trips. Also involved was the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC). This "united front" organization's link to the Chinese government was not then well known, though in recent years it has been publicly linked to the People's Liberation Army's Political Warfare Department, which has intelligence responsibilities.⁶ Meanwhile, other exchanges with US congressional specialists on China were promoted by a mysterious "united front" operative with excellent official contacts in China named Jimmy Wong. In this troubled decade, Wong made himself known to a wide range of Americans playing a role in China policy as having the ability to set up visits to China and meetings with key officials very quickly. He occasionally even opened his spacious Beijing home to congressional staffers. His precise affiliation with the Chinese authorities remains obscure.⁷

The approaches of the Chinese government to gain influence and gather information abroad differ from the tradecraft of Russia and the former Soviet Union.⁸ Notably, the Chinese focus more on individuals rather than effects, and on shaping the personal context rather than operational tricks. It is person-to-person relationships that carry the weight of Chinese information operations. Working on these personal ties, the Chinese authorities focus on facilitating meetings and contacts that may or may not result in opportunities to influence foreign targets. Still, because Chinese influence seeking is largely a governmental undertaking, it is hardly surprising that the Chinese mix influence

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