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Extraction Summary
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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
668 KB
Summary
This document is a page from a legal filing, specifically page 30 of Document 87 in Case 22-1426, dated July 27, 2023. It discusses the legal concept of "inferable bias," where a court can excuse a juror based on a significant risk of partiality, even without an explicit admission of bias. The text cites precedents from cases like Torres and McDonough to support the argument that bias can be inferred from a juror's non-disclosure of critical information during voir dire, and it specifically mentions that Juror 50 has offered an implausible explanation for such a non-disclosure.
People (2)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Brennan, J. | Justice |
Cited as concurring in the McDonough case (McDonough, 464 U.S. at 558 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
|
| Juror 50 | Juror |
Mentioned as claiming not to have connected his history with the charges in the case.
|
Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| This Court | government agency |
Mentioned as having recognized a third form of partiality, known as inferable bias.
|
| Second Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as having declined to "consider the precise scope of a trial judge's discretion to infer bias" in the Torre...
|
Timeline (1 events)
The voir dire process, during which a juror failed to disclose critical potentially disqualifying information.
Key Quotes (3)
"a few circumstances that involve no showing of actual bias, and that fall outside of the implied bias category, where a Court may, nevertheless, properly decide to excuse a juror."Source
— Torres, 128 F.3d at 46-47
(Describing the applicability of inferable bias.)
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Quote #1
"consider the precise scope of a trial judge's discretion to infer bias."Source
— Torres case (Second Circuit)
(Quoted as something the Second Circuit declined to do in the Torres case.)
DOJ-OGR-00021772.jpg
Quote #2
"Because [in such cases] the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias or partly because the juror may be unaware of it, [partiality] necessarily must be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances."Source
— Brennan, J.
(From a concurring opinion in the McDonough case, explaining why bias must sometimes be inferred.)
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Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,613 characters)
Case 22-1426, Document 87, 07/27/2023, 3548202, Page30 of 35
This Court has also recognized a third form of partiality, known as inferable
bias, applicable in "a few circumstances that involve no showing of actual bias, and
that fall outside of the implied bias category, where a Court may, nevertheless,
properly decide to excuse a juror." Torres, 128 F.3d at 46-47, Daugerdas, 867 F.
Supp. 2d at 475.
bias, applicable in "a few circumstances that involve no showing of actual bias, and
that fall outside of the implied bias category, where a Court may, nevertheless,
properly decide to excuse a juror." Torres, 128 F.3d at 46-47, Daugerdas, 867 F.
Supp. 2d at 475.
Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of
partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to
excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make a presumption of bias
mandatory. Torres at 43, 47. In Torres, the Second Circuit declined to "consider the
precise scope of a trial judge's discretion to infer bias." Id. The circumstances herein
present a scenario in which bias is inferred from the non-disclosure of critical
potentially disqualifying information at the time of voir dire because the risk of
partiality is sufficiently significant to excuse a juror for cause based on non-
disclosure. "Because [in such cases] the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the
juror himself, partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own
bias or partly because the juror may be unaware of it, [partiality] necessarily must
be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances." McDonough, 464 U.S. at
558 (Brennan, J., concurring).
partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to
excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make a presumption of bias
mandatory. Torres at 43, 47. In Torres, the Second Circuit declined to "consider the
precise scope of a trial judge's discretion to infer bias." Id. The circumstances herein
present a scenario in which bias is inferred from the non-disclosure of critical
potentially disqualifying information at the time of voir dire because the risk of
partiality is sufficiently significant to excuse a juror for cause based on non-
disclosure. "Because [in such cases] the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the
juror himself, partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own
bias or partly because the juror may be unaware of it, [partiality] necessarily must
be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances." McDonough, 464 U.S. at
558 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Juror 50 claims not to have connected his history with the charges in the case
despite the description in the questionnaire. The implausibility of the explanation
despite the description in the questionnaire. The implausibility of the explanation
24
DOJ-OGR-00021772
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